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SEPARATE BUT EQUAL: MIRANDA’S 
RIGHTS TO SILENCE AND COUNSEL 
STEVEN P. GROSSMAN* 
Three decades ago, the Supreme Court created a dubious distinction 
between the rights accorded to suspects in custody who invoke their right 
to silence and who invoke their right to counsel.  This distinction 
significantly disadvantages those who do not have the good sense or good 
fortune to specify they want an attorney when they invoke their right to 
remain silent.  This article argues that this distinction was flawed at its 
genesis and that it has led to judicial decisions that are inconsistent, make 
little sense, and permit police behavior that substantially diminishes the 
right to silence as described in Miranda v. Arizona.  The article does so by 
demonstrating that the distinction is unsupportable either theoretically or 
pragmatically.  It then shows that two recent holdings of the Court have 
paved the way for abolishing the distinction and developing an approach 
that both reflects the reality of custodial interrogation and is consistent 
with the principles behind the Fifth Amendment and the holding in 
Miranda. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
With two cases, decided in 1975 and 1981, the Supreme Court 
created a significant distinction between the impact of a custodial 
suspect’s decision to invoke his right to silence and his decision to 
invoke his right to counsel.  In Michigan v. Mosley,1 the Court held that 
the police may resume questioning a suspect after he invokes his right to 
silence, if three elements are met: First, the police must “scrupulously 
honor” this invocation by cutting off questioning; second, the police 
must wait a reasonable time and then administer the Miranda warnings 
again, and; third, the suspect once again must waive his rights.2  In 
Edwards v. Arizona,3 the Court took an entirely different approach to 
subsequent interrogation of a suspect who invokes his right to counsel.4  
The Court reasoned in Edwards that because a defendant who invokes 
his right to counsel is indicating his refusal to answer questions in a 
custodial environment without the presence of a lawyer, he cannot be 
reinterrogated without counsel present unless the suspect initiates the 
questioning himself.5 
In a series of cases based on the holding in Edwards, the Court built 
the wall separating the impact of invoking the right to counsel and the 
right to silence higher.  With its holding in Arizona v. Roberson,6 the 
Court extended the Edwards “initiation protection” to situations in 
which the suspect is being interrogated about a different crime than the 
one for which he invoked his right to counsel.7  In Minnick v. 
Mississippi,8 the Court decided that even when the suspect actually 
speaks with his counsel after invoking his right to counsel, the police 
cannot question the suspect after a subsequent waiver unless the suspect 
initiates the questioning or counsel is present during the questioning.9 
This article will argue that the distinction the Court drew between 
invocation of the right to silence and the right to counsel was highly 
questionable from its genesis in Mosley and Edwards.10  This distinction 
 
1. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). 
2. Id. at 104–07. 
3. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). 
4. Id. at 484. 
5. Id. at 484–85. 
6. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988). 
7. Id. at 686–87. 
8. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990). 
9. Id. at 153. 
10. See infra Part II. 
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has led to significantly different judicial treatment of suspects who 
invoke their right to counsel and those who invoke their right to silence, 
a difference unsupported by either theoretical or pragmatic 
justifications.11  The result of this differential treatment has been that 
suspects who invoke their right to silence receive far less protection 
from their Fifth Amendment rights than do suspects who invoke their 
right to counsel.12  This differential treatment afforded by courts often 
leads to decisions regarding the admissibility of statements that make no 
sense and can lead to unjust results.  Enhancing the impact of this 
dubious distinction in cases such as Roberson and Minnick has made a 
bad situation worse. 
Recently, however, in a series of cases culminating in its 2010 
decision, Maryland v. Shatzer,13 the Court paved the way for the 
abolition of this unfairly differential treatment afforded to suspects who 
invoke the right to silence.  This has been achieved by decisions that 
undercut the distinction in several ways.  First, the Court clearly 
identified and described the risk that is present when police seek to 
reinterrogate a suspect after he invokes the rights protected by 
Miranda.14  The risk posed in such situations is that if the suspect 
ultimately waives his Miranda rights, the waiver may be the product of 
impermissible police badgering.15  This danger exists regardless of 
whether the suspect invoked his right to silence or his right to counsel.  
Second, the Court treated other aspects of the invocation of the rights to 
silence and counsel in the same manner, 16 leaving the impact on 
reinterrogation of invoking one right as opposed to the other as the sole 
difference between the two rights.  Third, in Shatzer the Court 
dispensed with the all or nothing approach it had taken regarding 
invocation of the right to counsel. 17  Before Shatzer, when a suspect 
invoked his right to counsel, he was apparently forever protected from 
reinterrogation while in custody unless he initiated questioning or had 
counsel present.  Shatzer put a time limit on the duration of the Edwards 
initiation protection.18  Thus, the Court closed the distance regarding 
 
11. See infra Part II. 
12. See infra Part II. 
13. Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010). 
14. Id. at 1219–20.  
15. Id. at 1220. 
16. See infra Part V.C. 
17. See infra Part V.C (discussing Shatzer). 
18. See Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1227 (concluding that a two week break between attempts 
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permissible reinterrogation of suspects who invoke the right to silence 
and those who invoke the right of counsel.19  It now makes more sense 
than ever for the Court to adopt an approach to reinterrogation after 
the invocation of the right to silence that precisely matches the one 
applied to the invocation of the right to counsel.  The reasoning used by 
the Court in Shatzer regarding what is needed to prevent badgering 
stemming from reinterrogation is the same regardless of which right the 
suspect invokes.  With such an approach, the police could seek to 
reinterrogate a suspect in custody if he initiated the questioning, or after 
the passage of fourteen days—during which the suspect had a break 
from custody.  In either case, as the police do now, they would first need 
to rewarn the suspect of his rights and obtain a waiver of those rights. 
Part II of this Article will demonstrate that the Supreme Court, 
through its holdings in Mosley and Edwards, created the distinction for 
permissible reinterrogation between suspects who invoke their right to 
silence and those who invoke their right to counsel.  It will argue that 
the distinction is a flawed one that has no support in either the Fifth 
Amendment or in the Court’s foundational holding in Miranda v. 
Arizona.20  Part III will show that the approach taken in Edwards and 
Mosley led to subsequent decisions that expand and stretch the 
distinction and make a bad situation worse.  Part IV will explore the 
theoretical and pragmatic assumptions that undergird the Court’s 
support of the idea that invocations of the right to silence and 
invocations of the right to counsel should be treated differently.  This 
Part IV will also demonstrate that each of these assumptions is incorrect 
and will offer a solution to the problem.  The proposed solution would 
remedy the unfairness created by the distinction and be consistent with 
the Court’s recent approach to issues surrounding the protections 
afforded by the Miranda decision. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT CREATES THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN 
SILENCE AND COUNSEL 
A. Miranda and the Fifth Amendment 
In its landmark 1966 holding, Miranda v. Arizona,21 the Supreme 
 
to question terminated the Edwards protection). 
19. Id. at 1227. 
20. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); infra Part II. 
21. Miranda, 384 U.S. 436. 
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Court held that all suspects being interrogated while in custody must be 
advised of their right to remain silent, that any statement they make can 
be used against them, that they have the right to counsel, and that they 
will be provided an attorney if they cannot afford one.22  In most ways, 
the Miranda Court treated the rights to silence and counsel in the same 
manner.  Each right had to be given and each right had to be waived 
before any interrogation could begin.23  Failure to obtain a waiver of 
either right would prevent the prosecution from subsequently using the 
suspect’s statement at his trial.24  Either right could be invoked even 
after the suspect started to speak, and should the suspect invoke either 
right, the questioning must stop immediately.25  In fact, if any 
significance is given to primacy, it is worth noting that the Miranda 
Court’s first mention of a right to be afforded to suspects in custodial 
interrogation was, “[a]t the outset . . . [that] he must first be 
informed . . . that he has the right to remain silent.”26 
No right to counsel appears in the text of the Fifth Amendment.27  
The textual constitutional right to counsel in criminal cases stems from 
the Sixth Amendment.28  The Court in Miranda, however, determined 
that the only way to protect the right to be free from compulsory self-
incrimination, a Fifth Amendment protection, is to afford the defendant 
the right to counsel in what it held is a Fifth Amendment setting, 
custodial interrogation.29  This Fifth Amendment right to counsel, unlike 
the right to counsel in the Sixth Amendment, was not designed to 
protect the defendant in the adversarial phase of a criminal 
prosecution.30  Its purpose now, among other things, is to ensure the 
protection of the right to silence during the inherently coercive 
 
22. Id. at 444.  
23. Id. at 479. 
24. Id.  
25. Id. at 473–75. 
26. Id. at 467–68. 
27. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
28. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”). 
29. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470. 
30. James J. Tomkovicz, Standards for Invocation and Waiver of Counsel in Confession 
Contexts, 71 IOWA L. REV. 975, 987 (1986) (“[T]he [S]ixth [A]mendment grants the assistance 
of counsel only when the government has decided, as a general matter, to become an 
adversary, and it extends that assistance only to instances of governmental conduct that pose 
cognizable risks to the goal of adversarial equality.”).  
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atmosphere that attends custodial interrogations.31  Under the Fifth 
Amendment, as interpreted by the Court in Miranda, the right to silence 
is the basic right, and the right to counsel exists only to protect the right 
to silence.32  This makes sense because the rights identified by the Court 
in Miranda derive from the Fifth Amendment guarantee that no person 
shall be compelled to be a witness against himself or herself.33  In other 
words, the person can choose to remain silent.34  It was hardly surprising, 
therefore, that the Miranda  discussion of the rights to be afforded 
suspects begins with the right to remain silent.35 
B. The Court Distinguishes the Rights to Silence and Counsel 
In two cases, decided nine and fifteen years after Miranda, the Court 
addressed whether a defendant who invokes his right to silence and one 
who invokes his right to counsel can be reinterrogated while in custody.36  
The holdings in these two cases—Michigan v. Mosley37 and Edwards v. 
Arizona38—created substantially different protections regarding 
reinterrogation of such suspects.39  It is important to understand why and 
how the Court embarked on different paths when considering the 
silence and counsel protections created by Miranda. 
 
31. Id. at 989.  Tomkovicz argues: 
The origins of and rationale for Miranda counsel suggest a role different than that of 
the sixth amendment assistant.  In essence, Miranda counsel is a buffer against the 
power of a state tempted to force incriminating statements from an unwilling 
suspect.  Fifth amendment counsel’s primary function, therefore, is to provide a 
means and opportunity to prevent undue pressure to confess guilt.  The promise of 
legal assistance is intended to counter compulsion and ensure that information 
surrendered is the product of an unfettered choice.  
Id. (footnotes omitted).  
32. Scott W. Howe, The Troubling Influence of Equality in Constitutional Criminal 
Procedure: From Brown to Miranda, Furman and Beyond, 54 VAND. L. REV. 359, 402 (2001); 
Donald A. Dripps, Miranda After 25 Years: Alive and Well?, TRIAL, Mar. 1991, at 13. 
33. Miranda, 348 U.S. at 479. 
34. Id. at 469. 
35. Id. at 467–68 (“At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to 
interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right 
to remain silent.”). 
36.  Under Miranda, a suspect can invoke either or both rights.  See Miranda, 348 U.S. at 
444–45. 
37. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 106–07 (1975). 
38. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981). 
39. Mosley was the first Supreme Court decision to distinguish invocation of the right to 
silence from the right to counsel.  Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the 
Interests of the Legal Profession?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 453, 484 (2008).  
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Mosley was arrested for his participation in a robbery.40  When given 
his Miranda rights, Mosley said he did not wish to speak with the police, 
and the detective immediately ceased questioning him.41  Two hours 
later, another detective questioned Mosley in a different part of the 
police station about an unrelated homicide case.42  Mosley was again 
given his Miranda rights, but this time agreed to talk.43  The statement 
he made to the second detective was introduced by the government at 
his trial.44 
Mosley challenged the introduction of his statement, claiming his 
invocation of the right to silence barred the police from reinterrogating 
him.45  The Court held that such an invocation of the right to silence is 
not eternal and that under certain conditions the suspect could be 
reinterrogated while in custody.46  In the Mosley case, the Court found it 
significant that the detective had “scrupulously honored”47 the 
defendant’s right to silence by immediately cutting off questioning, 
waiting a reasonable time before reinterrogating him, and providing the 
defendant with a fresh set of Miranda warnings (which he waived).48  
The Court also seemed to find some significance in the fact that the 
questioning was done by a different detective in a different location at 
the police station and, also, that the questioning involved a different 
case from the one in which the defendant had previously invoked his 
right to silence.49 
 
40. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 97. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 97–98. 
43. Id. at 98. 
44. Id. at 99. 
45. Id. at 98–99. 
46. Id. at 102–03. 
47. Id. at 103 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966)). 
48. Id. at 104–05. 
49. Id.  These factors no longer appear to be important to an analysis under Mosley of 
whether a defendant’s invocation of the right to silence was scrupulously honored.  Instead, 
subsequent cases have focused on the immediate cessation of questioning, waiting a 
reasonable time before reinterrogation, and providing a fresh set of Miranda warnings.  See, 
e.g., Barton, supra note 39, at 483 (discussing how cases after Mosley have deemphasized 
whether the reinterrogation after invocation of the right to silence deals with a different 
crime). 
 It is interesting to note that although discussing invocation of the right to counsel, the 
Court, in a recent opinion, made this observation about questioning in a different location by 
a different law enforcement official:  
Reinterrogation in different custody or by a different interrogating agency would 
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In assessing whether a defendant who invokes his right to silence can 
be reinterrogated, the Court appropriately looked to the holding in 
Miranda for guidance.  The passage in Miranda that addresses this issue 
says: 
If the individual indicates in any manner . . . that he wishes to 
remain silent, the interrogation must cease.  At this point he has 
shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; 
any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot 
be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.  
Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody 
interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice 
in producing a statement after the privilege has been once 
invoked.50 
The Mosley Court acknowledged that this passage “does not state under 
what circumstances, if any, a resumption of questioning is permissible.”51  
It offered three possible literal interpretations of the passage.  One 
interpretation would mean the defendant could never be reinterrogated 
once he invokes his right to silence.52  A second would regard any 
subsequent statement as involuntary no matter how voluntary it actually 
was.53  The third would allow the police to reinterrogate after a short 
stoppage of the interrogation.54  The Mosley Court found all of these 
interpretations to be “absurd.”55  It said that the first two interpretations 
would “transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational 
obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity, and deprive suspects 
of an opportunity to make informed and intelligent assessments of their 
interests.”56  The Court expressed concern that the third literal 
interpretation could lead to the type of police badgering prohibited by 
 
seem, if anything, less likely than termination of custody to reduce coercive 
pressures.  At the original site, and with respect to the original interrogating agency, 
the suspect has already experienced cessation of interrogation when he demands 
counsel—which he may have no reason to expect elsewhere. 
Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1222 n.5 (2010).  There is no reason why this observation 
should not apply to reinterrogation after invocation of the right to silence as well.  
50. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 100–01 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473–74 (1966)). 
51. Id. at 101. 
52. Id. at 101–02. 
53. Id. at 102. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
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Miranda.57  Thus, the Court held that questioning of a custodial suspect 
who invokes the right to silence could be renewed once the safeguards 
referred to above were honored.58  It is worth noting that, in dicta, both 
the Mosley majority59 and the concurring opinion of Justice White60 
interpreted the language of Miranda speaking to what happens after a 
defendant invokes his right to counsel to be significantly different than 
what happens after a defendant invokes his right to silence.  This 
difference is what presaged the holding six years later in Edwards v. 
Arizona.61 
In Edwards, Robert Edwards was arrested for robbery and murder.62  
After being given his Miranda rights and waiving them, Edwards made 
an exculpatory statement.63  He then indicated he wished to have an 
attorney to help him make a deal. 64  The questioning stopped at this 
point.65  The next day, after a “guard told him that ‘he had’ to talk” to 
the police, Edwards met with detectives and was again given his 
Miranda rights.66  He waived those rights and made a statement 
inculpating himself in the crime.67  The Supreme Court held that 
Edwards’ inculpatory statement violated his Fifth Amendment right to 
counsel identified in Miranda.68  The Court ruled that after a suspect 
invokes his right to counsel during custodial interrogation, he cannot be 
reinterrogated while in custody unless his attorney is present or he 
initiates the questioning.69  The Edwards Court said that the issue was 
decided by the language in Miranda that once a suspect invokes his right 
to counsel, “the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.”70 
Apparently the Edwards Court, unlike the Court in Mosley, was not 
troubled by applying what it considered to be a literal interpretation to 
 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 104. 
59. Id. at 104 n.10 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966)). 
60. Id. at 109–10 (White, J., concurring). 
61. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981). 
62. Id. at 478. 
63. Id. at 479 (recounting that Edwards “denied involvement and gave a taped statement 
presenting an alibi defense”). 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 480. 
69. Id. at 484–85. 
70. Id. at 485 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966)).  
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the words of the Miranda holding prohibiting any custodial questioning 
once a Miranda right is invoked.71  Unlike the Court in Mosley, the 
Edwards Court seemed to have little concern for the “absurd” result 
that would “transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational 
obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity, and deprive suspects 
of an opportunity to make informed and intelligent assessments of their 
interests” due to the inability of the police to ever initiate a 
reinterrogation of the defendant (unless counsel was present).72  
Another apparent change in concern from Mosley to Edwards is seen by 
comparing the concurring opinion of Justice White in Mosley to his 
majority opinion in Edwards.  In his concurring opinion in Mosley, 
Justice White had criticized the majority for seeming to impose a time 
limit after invocation of the right to silence before questioning could 
begin again.73  To Justice White, all that mattered regarding the 
admissibility of such a statement was whether the defendant’s waiver of 
his rights was voluntary.74  For a court to suppress a statement when the 
defendant had knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights, even if he 
had previously invoked them, was “paternalistic” in Justice White’s 
 
71. As one commentator wrote: 
The Court has attempted to justify this distinction in several ways.  First, it points to 
the language in Miranda as supporting the difference between the treatment of the 
right to silence and that of the right to counsel.  That language, however, is at best 
equivocal.  The effect of the two rights is at times described interchangeably in 
Miranda: when either is invoked, the police must “cease” the interrogation.  In other 
passages, the Court modified this by adding that when the right to counsel is 
invoked, interrogation must cease “until an attorney is present.”  But if the former 
statement—that interrogation “must cease”—is not taken literally to mean that all 
police-initiated interrogation must stop for all time and in all circumstances, why is 
the latter viewed as absolute?  In other words, why should the fact that the ending 
point is specified—when counsel is present—be read to mean that event is the only 
possible breaking point in Edwards?  Unless we read into the passage that an 
attorney being present is not only a sufficient condition for terminating Edwards 
rights and permitting reinterrogation, but also a necessary one, there is no reason to 
view the rights differently.  Both could potentially be ended by myriad factors, as 
the Court recognized in Mosley.  In fact, the Court has held that the presence of 
counsel is not a necessary condition for requestioning since a suspect’s initiation 
allows the police to seek a valid waiver and commence interrogation even in the 
absence of counsel. 
Marcy Strauss, Reinterrogation, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 359, 384 (1995) (footnotes 
omitted) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966)). 
72. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102 (1975). 
73. Id. at 110–11 (White, J., concurring). 
74. See id. at 111. 
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eyes.75  However, his majority opinion in Edwards seems to adopt the 
very “paternalistic” approach he warned against in Mosley.  This 
difference in approaches is justified presumably because, by invoking his 
right to counsel, “[the] accused has . . . expressed his desire to deal with 
the police only through counsel.”76  When he invokes his right to silence, 
however, apparently the suspect means only that he does not wish to 
speak for an hour or two.77 
In Edwards, the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Burger78 and 
Justice Powell79 would have limited the decision to the facts of the case, 
most prominently that the police guard had told Edwards he had to talk 
to the police.80  Burger and Powell both believed that a suspect has the 
right to change his mind after an invocation of a Miranda right as long as 
the waiver accompanying that change of mind is voluntary.81  While it 
could be argued that once a right has been invoked a change of mind 
can never be truly voluntary in the coercive environment of custodial 
interrogation,82 it is hard to understand why a knowing waiver regarding 
reinterrogation (without initiation by the suspect) can be voluntary after 
an invocation of the right to silence but not after an invocation of the 
right to counsel.83 
III. MAKING A BAD DISTINCTION WORSE 
A. Extending the Edwards Protection to Interrogation about a Different 
Case 
Having created a substantial distinction between the power of the 
police to reinterrogate a suspect who invoked his right to silence and 
one who invoked his right to counsel, the Court then handed down a 
 
75. Id. at 109. 
76. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981). 
77. See Barton, supra note 39, at 483; see also infra note 140 (citing cases where the 
duration between the time of invocation and permissible reinterrogation was two hours or 
less).   
78. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 487–88 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
79. Id. at 489–92 (Powell, J., concurring). 
80. Id. at 488 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 490 (Powell, J., concurring). 
81. Id. at 488 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 490 (Powell, J., concurring). 
82. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 100–02 (1975) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436, 473–74 (1966)). 
83. Nelson G. Wolff, Note, Minnick v. Mississippi: The Supreme Court Reinforces a 
Suspect’s Right to Have Counsel Present During Custodial Interrogation, 56 MO. L. REV. 1157, 
1180 (1991); Dripps, supra note 32, at 16.   
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number of decisions that both expanded and stretched this distinction.  
In Arizona v. Roberson,84 the Court held that once a suspect invokes his 
right to counsel during custodial interrogation, he cannot be 
reinterrogated about any crime (including the crime for which he was 
arrested), unless he initiates the questioning or he has his attorney 
present during the questioning.85  The reinterrogation in Roberson 
occurred three days after Roberson’s invocation of his right to counsel; 
whereas, Mosley was reinterrogated only two hours after his invocation 
of the right to silence.86  Moreover, in concluding that Mosley’s right to 
silence was “fully respected” after his invocation of the right, the Court 
found it significant that the questioning involved “a crime different in 
nature and in time and place of occurrence” from the crimes for which 
Mosley originally invoked the right.87  However, the fact that Roberson’s 
reinterrogation involved a crime also different in time and location from 
the original one for which he invoked his right to counsel seemed 
unimportant to the Roberson Court.88  Instead, the Court focused on the 
idea that the bright-line rule of Edwards should not be disregarded 
merely because the suspect, while still in custody, was being interrogated 
about a crime different than the one for which he invoked his right to 
counsel.89 
Taken together then, the Court’s holdings in Mosley, Edwards, and 
Roberson maintain the seeming anomaly that a defendant who invokes 
his right to silence is not being badgered when police reinterrogate him 
two hours later about a different crime, while one who invokes his right 
to counsel is being badgered when reinterrogated the next day—or three 
days later—even if, the reinterrogation concerns a different crime.  The 
Court in Roberson put no time limit on the duration of this notion of 
badgering regarding reinterrogation after invocation of the right to 
counsel.90  So, presumably, a defendant who is interrogated years after 
his invocation of the right to counsel in one case cannot be interrogated 
 
84. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988).  
85. Id. at 686–87. 
86. Id. at 678; Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104. 
87. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104–05. 
88. See Roberson, 486 U.S. at 687–88 (noting that the need to determine whether the 
suspect has requested counsel exists regardless of whether reinterrogation concerns the same 
or a different offense, or whether the same or different law enforcement authorities are 
involved in the second investigation). 
89. Id. 
90. See Roberson, 486 U.S. at 677–78.   
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about another case while in custody, even as to a totally different crime.  
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals applied this very reasoning 
in suppressing a statement made five months after the defendant’s 
invocation of the right to counsel.91  In fact, in United States v. Green, the 
defendant had already pled guilty in the drug case in which he had 
invoked his right to counsel before making a statement in a totally 
unconnected murder case five months later.92  The appellate court held 
this would still be regarded as badgering under Edwards.93  It is 
important, therefore, to see the justification the Court provides in 
Roberson for taking such a position. 
According to the Court in Roberson, when a defendant invokes his 
right to counsel in custodial interrogation, he is expressing the belief 
that he is “not capable of undergoing such questioning without advice of 
counsel,”94 and he is “not competent to deal with the authorities without 
legal advice.”95  The Roberson Court also exalted the benefits to law 
enforcement and the courts of providing a “bright-line rule” that 
provides “‘clear and unequivocal’ guidelines” of what action can and 
cannot be taken after a defendant invokes his right to counsel.96  In fact, 
the benefits of a specific bright-line rule are so important, both to the 
government and the defendant, that they outweigh the consequences of 
the inability to present to the fact-finder what the Court called “highly 
probative evidence” of an otherwise voluntary statement by the 
accused.97  Apparently, the benefits of such a bright-line rule are not 
relevant to what the government may do after a defendant invokes his 
right to silence as a defendant may be reinterrogated after a “reasonable 
time” during which his rights are scrupulously honored.98 
 
91. United States v. Green, 592 A.2d 985, 989–90 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 504 U.S. 
908 (1992), vacated as moot, 507 U.S. 545 (1993).  The Court granted certiorari, but when the 
defendant died, the appeal was vacated as moot.  Green, 507 U.S. at 545.   
92. Id. at 985–86. 
93. Id. at 989. 
94. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 681. 
95. Id. at 681 (adopting Justice White’s concurring view from Michigan v. Mosley, 423 
U.S. 96, 110 n.2 (1975)). 
96. Id. at 681–82. 
97. Id. at (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979)). 
98. For a discussion of “reasonable time” see infra note 140 and accompanying text.  
What constitutes the scrupulous honoring of a suspect’s rights after he invokes his Miranda 
right to remain silent is far from a bright line.  As Justice Sotomayor wrote recently, “as we 
have previously recognized, Mosley itself does not offer clear guidance to police about when 
and how interrogation may continue after a suspect invokes his rights.”  Berghuis v. 
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2276 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also infra note 355 
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In Roberson, the government argued that the issue was similar to 
that which confronted the Court the previous year in Connecticut v. 
Barrett.99  In Barrett, the defendant, after being given his Miranda rights 
while in custody, indicated he would speak to the police but would not 
give a written statement without counsel.100  The Barrett Court held that 
the defendant’s oral statement was admissible because he had the right 
to make a limited waiver of his right to counsel.101  Similarly, in 
Roberson, the government argued that the defendant made a limited 
waiver—one that was limited only to questioning involving the drug 
case.102  However, the Court held that, as a matter of fact, the case was 
distinguishable from Barrett because Roberson said he “wanted a lawyer 
before answering any questions.”103  The Court went on to hold that 
Roberson was also distinguishable as a matter of law.104  Implicitly then, 
even if Roberson had said he wanted counsel just for the drug case, the 
police still would be barred from initiating questioning about the murder 
case because that too would be seen as yielding to the pressure of the 
custodial setting.  This suggests that, a defendant can still be 
reinterrogated after his unconditional statement that he wants to remain 
silent, but a defendant who imposes at least some conditions on the 
exercise of his right to counsel cannot be reinterrogated—even if those 
conditions are met by the police.  To avoid such an anomaly, the 
invocation of either right should be treated in the same manner. 
The other reason the Court offered in support of its decision in 
Roberson regarding invocation of the right to counsel also invites 
application to invocation of the right to silence.  The Court rejected the 
government’s argument that a fresh set of Miranda warnings before the 
reinterrogation of the defendant after he had previously invoked his 
right to counsel would “‘reassure’ a suspect . . . that his rights have 
remained untrammeled.”105  It reasoned that the defendant had been 
 
(setting forth cases showing inconsistency regarding the application of the Mosley factors).    
99. See Roberson, 486 U.S. at 683; Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 (1987). 
100. Barrett, 479 U.S. at 525. 
101. Id. at 529. 
102. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 683. 
103. Id.   
104. Id. (“As a matter of law, the presumption raised by a suspect’s request for 
counsel—that he considers himself unable to deal with the pressures of custodial 
interrogation without legal assistance—does not disappear simply because the police have 
approached the suspect, still in custody, still without counsel, about a separate 
investigation.”). 
105. Id. at 686. 
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denied his request for counsel for three days, hardly an environment 
designed to reassure him that his rights were being honored.106  While 
this reason seems to apply primarily to invocation of the counsel,107 what 
the Court said immediately after should apply to invocation of the right 
to silence as well.  The Court wrote, “[T]here is a serious risk that the 
mere repetition of the Miranda warnings would not overcome the 
presumption of coercion that is created by prolonged police custody.”108  
In Mosley, however, the Court held that the repetition of Miranda 
warnings even after prolonged custody—apparently the more prolonged 
the better to prevent badgering109—plays a role in ensuring that the 
reinterrogation of a defendant after he invokes his right to silence is not 
coercive.110 
B. Applying the Edwards Protection even After the Suspect is Permitted 
to Consult with Counsel 
Now fully invested in the distinction it created between 
reinterrogation of the suspect who invokes his right to counsel and the 
suspect who invokes his right to silence, the Court went all-in with its 
decision in Minnick v. Mississippi.111  In Minnick, the Court held—
notwithstanding the fact that after requesting counsel the police allowed 
Minnick to speak with his lawyer on two or three occasions—that the 
subsequent statement was still not compliant with Edwards.112 
The facts of Minnick are interesting because, unlike those of 
Edwards and Roberson, they seem to demonstrate a situation in which 
 
106. Id. 
107. See id.  One could argue, however, that any police attempt to reinterrogate a 
suspect in custody who has previously insisted on her right to remain silent is hardly designed 
to assure the suspect that her rights are being honored either. 
108. Id. at 686 (footnote omitted). 
109. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102 (1975).  This is because in Mosley, the 
Court held that the longer the period of time between when the suspect invokes his right to 
silence and when the police attempt to reinterrogate him, the more the suspect’s rights were 
scrupulously honored.  See id.  However, it is arguable that the longer the time the suspect 
remains in police custody, isolated from friends and family, the more susceptible he will be to 
having his resistance to speaking with the police worn down.  Christopher S. Thrutchley, 
Minnick v. Mississippi: Rationale of Right to Counsel Necessitates Reversal of Michigan v. 
Mosley’s Right to Silence Ruling, 27 TULSA L.J. 181, 197–98 (1991); see also Strauss, supra 
note 71, at 401 (discussing how in the right to counsel context, a longer period of custody may 
increase the coercion on the suspect). 
110. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 105–06.  
111. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990).  
112. Id. at 149–50. 
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the police affirmatively honored the defendant’s request for counsel.  
After making certain admissions regarding a murder case, Minnick told 
the FBI interrogators to “[c]ome back Monday when I have a lawyer” 
and that he “would make a more complete statement then with his 
lawyer present.”113  A lawyer was appointed for Minnick, and he spoke 
with the lawyer on several occasions.114  On the Monday referred to by 
Minnick above, three days after the invocation of his right to counsel, a 
local sheriff questioned Minnick and obtained a confession.115  Minnick 
challenged the admission of this latter confession, claiming his right to 
be free from police-initiated reinterrogation after invocation of his right 
to counsel had been violated.116  The Court ruled in his favor, concluding 
that even speaking with counsel does not free the government of the 
requirement that counsel be present during such reinterrogations.117 
As it did with the language of Miranda in Mosley and Edwards, the 
Court in Minnick made an interesting choice of which words from 
previous opinions to take literally and which to view more expansively.  
At the outset of its opinion in Minnick, the Court referred to the 
holding in Edwards, which stated that after an invocation of the right to 
counsel, police may not initiate reinterrogation of the suspect “until 
counsel has been made available to him.”118  Counsel had not only been 
“made available” to Minnick, but Minnick exercised this right by 
speaking with his lawyer on two or three occasions.119  According to 
Mississippi’s highest court, Edwards had been complied with.120  The 
Supreme Court, however, interpreted language it had written both 
before and after Edwards as indicating that the language cited above 
from Edwards apparently did not mean what it said.  It selectively 
quoted from Miranda’s prohibition on reinterrogating a suspect who has 
invoked his right to counsel “until an attorney is present,”121 selective, 
because the Court neglected to point out that two paragraphs later, the 
Miranda Court stated, “If the interrogation continues without . . . an 
attorney[,] . . . a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate 
 
113. Id. at 148–49. 
114. Id. at 149. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 153. 
118. Id. at 149–50 (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981)). 
119. See id.  
120. Id. at 150. 
121. Id. at 152 (emphasis added) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966)). 
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that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege 
against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed 
counsel.”122  Thus, rather than prohibiting reinterrogation without an 
attorney, the Miranda Court envisioned the possibility of 
reinterrogation of a defendant who invokes his right to counsel but 
required the government to meet a heavy burden in showing his change 
of mind was valid.123 
The Minnick Court then quoted from three of its post-Edwards 
opinions in which the Court had referred to the protection of Edwards 
as existing unless counsel is present during reinterrogation following 
invocation of the right to counsel.124  In none of those three cases, 
however, had counsel been appointed for the defendants nor had they 
consulted with counsel, as had happened in Minnick.125  In fact, those 
three cases had nothing to do with the issue of whether consulting with 
counsel satisfied the Edwards requirement, so it is questionable whether 
the Court’s description of that aspect of the previous holdings should be 
used to negate the clear language of Edwards.126  Still, the Court 
conceded that until its decision in Minnick, there were “ambiguities” on 
this point in its previous decisions.127  Given these ambiguities, the 
Minnick Court rightly looked to the pragmatic meaning of the Edwards 
protection to determine if its requirement protecting suspects was 
honored in this case.128 
The first evidence that the Miranda protection was violated in this 
case, according to the Court, was that Minnick testified that, although he 
resisted, his jailers told him not once, but twice, that he had to speak to 
the government interrogators.129  If the defendant’s testimony was 
 
122. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 n.14 (1964)). 
123. See id.  
124. Minnick, 498 U.S. at 152–53. 
125. Id. at 149, 152–53 (citing Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 680 (1988); Shea v. 
Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51, 52 (1985); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1043 (1983)).  The 
significance of Minnick’s having actually conferred with his counsel should be to “reinforce 
the suspect” in his decision not to speak and therefore make the risk of coercion no greater 
for Minnick than for a suspect who invokes his right to remain silent.  Dripps, supra note 32, 
at 16.  
126. Minnick, 498 U.S. at 161–62 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the purpose of the 
Edwards protection is to ensure that the defendant can consult with his attorney and 
therefore be aware of his rights after requesting counsel as he did here).  
127. Id. at 153 (majority opinion). 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 148–49.  On two different occasions, Minnick was told that he would “have to 
go down [to the interview] or else” and that he would “have to talk” to law enforcement 
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deemed credible and it was combined with Minnick’s refusal to sign a 
waiver form, it could have formed the basis for an opinion that 
Minnick’s confession violated Miranda without having to stretch the 
Edwards language to get there.  Instead, the Court said this was an 
example of why mere consultation with counsel was inadequate to 
protect defendants who had previously invoked their right to counsel.130  
The Court speculated that the actions above might show that Minnick 
was confused about the admissibility of any statements he would make 
to the police, and the presence of counsel during questioning could have 
clarified any such confusion.131  A far more likely scenario would be that 
during the several conversations Minnick had with his attorney after 
invoking his right to counsel, his attorney informed him quite 
definitively of his right not to answer any questions.132  In fact, any 
attorney not offering such advice in Minnick’s situation would be 
incompetent.133  Thus, Minnick likely received the type of protection, 
from counsel, envisioned in Edwards. 
The Court found additional justification for its holding in Minnick 
from the need to keep application of the Edwards protection “clear and 
unequivocal.”134  In this regard, the Court noted that even if the Edwards 
protection was satisfied by the kinds of consultation with counsel that 
occurred here, it was undisputed that the protection would arise anew 
should the defendant again invoke his right to counsel.135  According to 
the Court, this would cause the Edwards protection to “pass in and out 
of existence multiple times.”136  The Court then asserted that “[v]agaries 
of this sort spread confusion through the justice system and lead to a 
 
officials.  Id. 
130. Id. at 153–54. 
131. Id. at 154. 
132. Id. at 157 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Joint App. at 46–47, Minnick v. Mississippi, 
498 U.S. 196 (1990)) (noting that, in fact, Minnick testified that his attorney did advise him 
“to not talk to nobody and not tell nobody nothing and to not sign no waivers”).  
133. Id. at 162.  In the words of one commentator, “[a]s the Court has repeatedly noted 
‘any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to 
police under any circumstances.’”  Barton, supra note 39, at 487 (quoting Escobedo v. Illinois, 
378 U.S. 478, 488 (1964); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)).  
Barton also noted that “the very first thing any lawyer summoned to a police station by a 
Miranda request will do is find out what the client has already said and strongly advise the 
client to say nothing further.”  Barton, supra note 39, at 487.  
134. Minnick, 498 U.S. at 154–55. 
135. Id. at 154. 
136. Id.  
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consequent loss of respect for the underlying constitutional principle.”137 
This assertion by the Court is well taken and begs the question of 
why the same principle is not applied when the defendant invokes his 
right to silence.  Although Mosley made clear that such defendants can 
be reinterrogated if their right to silence is scrupulously honored, it is 
also undisputed that at any time during the reinterrogation the 
defendant could again invoke his right to silence and the questioning 
would have to cease.138  This would lead to precisely the same situation 
criticized so severely by the Court above.139  The Mosley protection in 
such a situation could pass in and out of existence multiple times.  Take 
a situation in which a defendant in a custodial interrogation 
environment invokes his right to silence.  The police scrupulously honor 
the right by immediately ceasing their questioning, waiting a reasonable 
time (itself a vague standard) 140 and issuing a fresh set of Miranda 
warnings.  The police then reinterrogate the defendant as permitted 
under Mosley.  The defendant begins responding and again asserts his 
right to silence.141  Once again, the police must honor the invocation but 
can adhere to the Mosley requirements and come back yet again to 
reinterrogate the defendant.  This would lead the Mosley protection to 
“pass in and out of existence multiple times” 142 and warrants the same 
type of criticism from a consistent Supreme Court. 
The Court in Minnick reasoned that the confusion it described above 
is heightened by the imprecise meaning of consultation.143  One example 
it offered related to the length of time the consultation would have to be 
in order to satisfy the standard that the government proposed. 144  Would 
a “hurried interchange”145 between counsel and client be deemed 
 
137. Id. at 155. 
138. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 106–07 (1975). 
139. See supra notes 134–37 and accompanying text.  
140. See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 106–07; see also Robinson v. Attorney Gen. of Kan., 28 
F.App’x. 849, 853 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that a break of one hour between the invocation 
of the right to silence and the subsequent interrogation was sufficient); United States v. 
Thompson, 866 F.2d 268, 271–72 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that a break of thirty minutes was a 
reasonable period of time, after which law enforcement officers could reinterrogate the 
defendant); United States v. Udey, 748 F.2d 1231, 1242 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that six hours 
was a reasonable period of time under Mosley). 
141. See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 106–07.  
142. See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 154–55 (1990). 
143. Id. at 155. 
144. Id. 
145. Id.  
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sufficient or would there have to be a “lengthy in-person conference”?146  
Again, this is a fair question, and again the parallel to a Mosley situation 
is inescapable.  How much time must pass after invocation of the right to 
silence before the police may come back and reinterrogate the 
defendant while still being said to have “scrupulously” observed his 
right?  In Mosley that time period was two hours.147  In subsequent cases, 
time periods as short as ten or thirty minutes have been found to be 
acceptable.148  How many times may the police come back after the 
defendant’s assertion and reassertion of his right to silence?149  Tje 
confusion and ambiguities identified by the Court regarding the 
Edwards standard of sufficiency of consultation with counsel are also 
present in the Mosley standard of sufficiency of invocation of the right 
to silence. 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Minnick takes the position that there is no 
significant distinction, either constitutional or practical, between the 
protection the defendant receives from consultation with counsel and 
having counsel present during the reinterrogation.150  Because Scalia has 
been a harsh critic of the holdings in Edwards and even Miranda,151 it is 
 
146. Id. 
147. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975). 
148. See United States v. Thompson, 866 F.2d 268, 271–72 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding 
defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights were not violated when law enforcement officer 
resumed questioning approximately thirty minutes after defendant had invoked his right to 
remain silent); United States v. Hsu, 852 F.2d 407, 411–12 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding same); 
Lanosa v. Frank, No. 07-00115, 2007 WL 2746839, at *7 (D. Haw. Sept. 17, 2007) (holding 
police attempt to reinterrogate the defendant ten minutes after he had invoked his right to 
silence did not violate Fifth Amendment), aff’d, 304 F.App’x. 565, 566 (9th Cir. 2008); Stock 
v. Alaska, 191 P.3d 153, 155–56, 161 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008) (holding defendant’s Fifth 
Amendment rights were not violated when law enforcement officer resumed questioning 
approximately thirty minutes after defendant had invoked his right to remain silent). 
149. See, e.g., infra notes 223–35 (discussing Grant v. Warden, 616 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 
2010), cert. denied sub nom. Grant v. Barnhart, 131 S. Ct. 948 (2011)). 
150. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 161–62 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
151. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 448 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(referring to the Miranda decision as “objectionable” and “preposterous”); Minnick, 498 U.S. 
at 165 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  In Minnick, Justice Scalia stated: 
The Edwards rule is premised on an (already tenuous) assumption about the 
suspect’s psychological state, and when the event of consultation renders that 
assumption invalid the rule should no longer apply.  One searching for ironies in the 
state of our law should consider, first, the irony created by Edwards itself: The 
suspect in custody who says categorically “I do not wish to discuss this matter” can 
be asked to change his mind; but if he should say, more tentatively, “I do not think I 
should discuss this matter without my attorney present” he can no longer be 
approached. . . .  Today’s extension of the Edwards prohibition is the latest stage of 
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noteworthy to see Scalia’s agreement with Yale Kamisar—a staunch 
defender of Miranda—when it comes to the distinction between 
application of the right to silence and the right to counsel.152  In his 
dissent in Minnick, Justice Scalia writes: 
Drawing a distinction between police-initiated inquiry before 
consultation with counsel and police-initiated inquiry after 
consultation with counsel is assuredly more reasonable than 
other distinctions Edwards has already led us into—such as the 
distinction between police-initiated inquiry after assertion of the 
Miranda right to remain silent, and police-initiated inquiry after 
assertion of the Miranda right to counsel.153 
C. What the Court Giveth on One Hand 
While, on one hand, the Court created and strengthened the 
protection defendants receive once they have invoked the right to 
counsel during custodial interrogation, on the other hand, the Court 
made it difficult for defendants to take advantage of the Edwards 
protection.  In both Oregon v. Bradshaw154 and Davis v. United States,155 
the Court set up significant barriers to defendants seeking to suppress 
statements they claimed resulted from violations of Edwards.156  Both of 
these five-person majority opinions drew strong opposition from four 
Justices on the Court and substantial criticism from commentators.157 
 
prophylaxis built upon prophylaxis, producing a veritable fairyland castle of 
imagined constitutional restriction upon law enforcement.  This newest tower, 
according to the Court, is needed to avoid “inconsisten[cy] with [the] purpose” of 
Edwards’ prophylactic rule . . . which was needed to protect Miranda’s prophylactic 
right to have counsel present, which was needed to protect the right against 
compelled self-incrimination found (at last!) in the Constitution.  
Id. at 165–66 (quoting id. at 154 (majority opinion)). 
152. Minnick, 498 U.S. at 164 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (offering Yale Kamisar’s statement 
that “either Mosley was wrongly decided or Edwards was” (quoting Yale Kamisar, The 
Edwards and Bradshaw Cases: The Court Giveth and the Court Taketh Away, in 5 SUPREME 
COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 153, 157 (J. Choper et al. eds. 1984))). 
153. Minnick, 498 U.S. at 164 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
154. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983). 
155. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994). 
156. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981); Davis, 512 U.S. at 459; Bradshaw, 462 
U.S. at 1045–46. 
157. See, e.g., Jane M. Faulkner, Note, So You Kinda, Sorta, Think You Might Need a 
Lawyer?: Ambiguous Requests for Counsel After Davis v. United States, 49 ARK. L. REV. 275, 
277–78 (1996) (concluding that the Davis decision left open the issue of ambiguity and will 
result in a flood of litigation focusing on the exact language and actions a defendant must use 
to invoke the right to counsel); Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Love–Hate Relationship 
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After police gave Bradshaw his Miranda rights in connection with 
the investigation of a homicide, Bradshaw denied active involvement in 
the crime and then invoked his right to counsel.158  As he was about to be 
transported from the police station to the local jail, Bradshaw asked a 
police officer, “Well, what is going to happen to me now?”159  After 
some further discussion between the two, Bradshaw agreed to take a 
polygraph.160  Upon being told that he had failed the polygraph, 
Bradshaw made an inculpatory statement.161  Bradshaw challenged the 
admission of that statement, claiming it was elicited in violation of his 
right to counsel as enumerated in Miranda and Edwards.162 
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Bradshaw’s 
comment to the officer inquiring what would happen to him constituted 
an initiation and, therefore, allowed the police to interrogate him under 
Edwards.163  The Oregon Court of Appeals held that Bradshaw’s 
comment—which came only minutes after he asked for an attorney—
was “a normal reaction to being taken from the police station and 
placed in a police car, obviously for transport to some destination.”164  In 
other words, Bradshaw wanted to know where he was headed and had 
 
with Miranda, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 375, 430 (2011) (“Bradshaw’s support for the 
notion that Miranda created three classifications of suspects cannot be reconciled with 
Thompkins’s concept of pre-waiver interrogation.”); Allen F. Loucks, Initiation: The 
Emperor’s New Test, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 608, 609 (1985) (“Adoption of the Bradshaw 
plurality’s reasoning by a majority of the Court would overrule Edwards sub silentio and 
present the spectacle, perhaps unique in the law of criminal procedure, of the Court creating 
rights devoid of substance.”); Marcy Strauss, The Sounds of Silence: Reconsidering the 
Invocation of the Right to Remain Silent Under Miranda, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 773, 
775, 794 (2009) (criticizing Davis and arguing “[j]udges have gone to extraordinary lengths to 
classify even seemingly clear invocations as ambiguous invocations which can be ignored by 
the police.”); Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519, 1588 
(2008) (arguing that Davis undermines the assumption in Miranda that questioning will only 
take place with suspects who have decided they are willing to speak, or that suspects can 
easily stop questioning once it has started). 
158. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1041–42. 
159. Id. at 1042. 
160. Id. 
161. Id.  Bradshaw recanted his earlier story and admitted that he had been driving the 
vehicle in which the victim was killed, that he had consumed a considerable amount of 
alcohol, and that he had passed out while driving.  Id. 
162. Id. at 1042–43.  Bradshaw’s motion to suppress the statement was denied during a 
bench trial, but the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statements had been 
obtained in violation of Bradshaw’s Fifth Amendment rights, and relying on the decision in 
Edwards.  Id. 
163. Id. at 1041. 
164. State v. Bradshaw, 636 P.2d 1011, 1013 (Or. Ct. App. 1981). 
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not intended to initiate a discussion, even generally, about his 
involvement in the crime.  The Supreme Court, in overturning the 
opinion of the Oregon Court of Appeals, held that Bradshaw’s comment 
“evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about 
the investigation,” and therefore, constituted an initiation under 
Edwards.165   
Speaking for the four Justices in dissent, Justice Marshall took no 
issue with the majority’s definition of initiation, but thought it extremely 
unlikely that Bradshaw was looking to initiate such a discussion of his 
crime.166  Marshall wrote, 
If respondent’s question had been posed by Jean-Paul Sartre 
before a class of philosophy students, it might well have evinced 
a desire for a “generalized” discussion.  But under the 
circumstances of this case, it is plain that respondent’s only 
“desire” was to find out where the police were going to take 
him.167 
Justice Marshall then noted that custody deprives one of control over 
his surroundings, so it is especially likely that a question—such as the 
one posed by Bradshaw—would relate to the immediate change of those 
surroundings.168 
It is interesting to note that in rendering its decision that Bradshaw’s 
question to the officer constituted an initiation under Edwards, the 
Court conceded that the question itself was ambiguous.169  Apparently, 
the Court chose not to interpret this ambiguity in favor of the 
defendant.170  In terms of interpreting ambiguity against the defendant 
when it comes to gaining access to the protections of Edwards, however, 
it is the Court’s opinion in Davis v. United States that is most 
noteworthy. 
In Davis, naval investigators took Davis into custody and gave him 
 
165. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045–46. 
166. Id. at 1055 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
167. Id.  
168. Id. at 1056 (noting that “[t]he very essence of custody is the loss of control over 
one’s freedom of movement” and that Bradshaw’s question was a natural response to his 
being in custody). 
169. Id. at 1045–46 (majority opinion). 
170. Id. (“Although ambiguous, the respondent’s question in this case as to what was 
going to happen to him evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about 
the investigation; it was not merely a necessary inquiry arising out of the incidents of the 
custodial relationship.”). 
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the military equivalent of his Miranda rights, after which he agreed to 
talk to the officers.171  Ninety minutes into the questioning, Davis said, 
“Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.”172  The investigators then attempted 
to clarify whether Davis was invoking his right to counsel.173  They told 
Davis that if he wanted a lawyer they would stop the questioning and 
not continue unless they could clarify whether he was invoking his 
right.174  At that point, Davis said he did not want a lawyer.175  The 
officers then took a short break and re-advised the defendant of both his 
right to remain silent and right to counsel before questioning him 
again.176  Davis later argued that all statements he made after what he 
claimed was an invocation of his right to counsel should be suppressed 
under Edwards.177  The U.S. Court of Military Appeals denied the 
defendant’s appeal, holding that the naval investigators did what they 
should have in the face of an ambiguous request for counsel.178  The 
investigators asked narrow questions designed to clarify whether Davis’s 
statement was an invocation of the right to counsel.179 
In assessing whether suspects’ words in custodial interrogation 
environments constituted invocation of the right to counsel and thereby 
engaged the protection of Edwards, the Court took an all-or-nothing 
approach.  The Court held that only an unambiguous request for an 
attorney invoked the protections of Edwards.180  Thus, the police need 
not stop questioning such a suspect because he might have requested 
counsel, rather the police must stop only if he actually makes such a 
request.181  Numerous commentators have observed that those who are 
 
171. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 454 (1994) (“As required by military law, the 
agents advised [Davis] that he was a suspect in the killing, that he was not required to make a 
statement, that any statement could be used against him at a trial by court-martial, and that 
he was entitled to speak with an attorney and have an attorney present during questioning.”). 
172. Id. at 455. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Id.  
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
178. United States v. Davis, 36 M.J. 337, 341 (C.M.A. 1993), aff’d, Davis, 512 U.S. at 459. 
179. Davis, 36 M.J. at 342. 
180. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459.  But, as one commentator observed, “[F]ailure to accord 
invocation status to any but the clearest claims to counsel seems equally misguided.  Too 
strict a standard would probably exclude many instances of conduct meant to be counsel 
assertions and, consequently, would risk constitutional losses in many cases that merit 
heightened protection.”  Tomkovicz, supra note 30, at 1011. 
181. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459.   
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young, inexperienced with the criminal justice system, less educated, or 
inarticulate are severely disadvantaged by requiring that invocation of 
the right to counsel be unambiguous.182  When such people are under the 
extreme pressures that attend custodial interrogation, it is even less 
likely that requests for counsel will be expressed with absolute 
certainty.183  The Court anticipated such criticism by conceding that such 
suspects may genuinely want counsel but may not express their desires 
with sufficient clarity to require ending the interrogation, after this 
decision.184  The Court’s response to this was twofold.  First, it said that 
the Miranda warnings themselves provide the primary means of assuring 
that any statement of the defendant is not violative of his rights, and that 
to avail themselves of the extra protection of Edwards, the defendant 
has to assert that right unambiguously.185  Second, the Court reasoned 
that allowing an ambiguous request for counsel to trigger the protection 
of Edwards would take away from the “clarity and ease of application” 
that the bright-line Edwards rule created.186  
Stating that the warnings themselves are the primary protection for 
suspects facing custodial interrogation hardly responds to the assertion 
that it is profoundly unfair to take advantage of a suspect who may want 
to assert her right to counsel but whose lack of education, language 
skills, or some other impediment makes him or her unlikely to do so 
with the definitiveness required by the Court in Davis.  As to the 
 
182. See, e.g., Richard Rogers et. al., “Everyone Knows Their Miranda Rights”: Implicit 
Assumptions and Countervailing Evidence, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 300, 306–07 (2010) 
(noting that in a study of 149 previously arrested defendants, 69.1% of defendants stated that 
they believed that “I want a lawyer” meant the same thing as saying “I might want a lawyer”); 
Marcy Strauss, Understanding Davis v. United States, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1011, 1012 (2006) 
(concluding that Davis will eviscerate the Miranda guarantees, particularly for women and 
minorities who tend not to speak in clear, declarative terms); Weisselberg, supra note 157, at 
1570 (noting that mentally disabled subjects in a study understood only about 20% of the 
critical words comprising the Miranda vocabulary and that their ability to understand the 
Miranda warnings was likewise severely impaired). 
183. In this regard, one commentator wrote: 
Equivocal assertions often indicate some susceptibility to the pressure of custodial 
interrogation or some interest in securing an advocate.  An approach that demands 
clarity and ignores anything less would deprive individuals of the adequate 
opportunities for decisions that are essential to Miranda and Massiah protections.  
Such treatment of potential invocations could undermine Miranda’s goal of 
dissipating compulsion by permitting refuge in counsel. 
Tomkovicz, supra note 30, at 1012. 
184. Davis, 512 U.S. at 460. 
185. Id. at 460–61. 
186. Id. at 461. 
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Court’s second response, cases subsequent to Davis show that the 
approach the Davis Court adopted hardly created clarity or ease of 
application with respect to whether a suspect is invoking the right to 
counsel.187 
Whatever one thinks of the Court’s conclusion about the significance 
of a suspect’s unambiguous invocation of the right to counsel, it is far 
harder to justify the Court’s cursory response to the requirements of 
police once a defendant makes an ambiguous request for counsel.  In 
Davis, the investigators stopped questioning about the crime until they 
clarified Davis’s ambiguous request.188  Only after they reminded Davis 
that if he wanted an attorney they would stop the questioning and Davis 
replied affirmatively that he did not want a lawyer did the investigators 
continue questioning him.189  It was the investigators’ clarification of 
Davis’s initial request for counsel that led the United States Court of 
Military Appeals to affirm the denial of Davis’s motion to suppress his 
statement.190  While referring to this clarification of an ambiguous 
 
187. Compare, e.g., Lord v. Duckworth, 29 F.3d 1216, 1220–21 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding 
that defendant’s statement during questioning that “I can’t afford a lawyer but is there 
anyway I can get one?” was not a “clear request” for counsel which would have required 
immediate cessation of questioning), and Kapocsi v. Oklahoma, 668 P.2d 1157, 1159–60 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1983) (holding that the statement “I’m thinking I will need a lawyer” was 
not a request for counsel), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1070 (1984), Clausen v. Texas, 682 S.W.2d 
328, 330–31 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that appellant’s statement to interrogating officer 
that he was trying to contact an attorney was not an invocation of the right to counsel), cert. 
denied, 475 U.S. 1021 (1986), with Abela v. Martin, 380 F.3d 915, 926 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding 
that defendant’s statement, “maybe I should talk to an attorney by the name of William 
Evans” was sufficient to invoke his right to counsel), United States v. Alamilla-Hernandez, 
654 F.Supp. 2d 1004, 1010 (D. Neb. 2009) (holding that the defendant’s statement “I cannot 
afford an attorney” was a clear invocation of his right to counsel),  and McDaniel v. Virginia, 
506 S.E.2d 21, 23 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (holding “I think I would rather have an attorney here 
to speak for me,” was an unambiguous invocation of the right to counsel), aff’d en banc, 518 
S.E.2d 851, 853 (Va. App. 1999). 
188. Davis, 512 U.S. at 455.  After Davis stated “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer[,]” the 
interview then proceeded as follows:  
[We] made it very clear that we’re not here to violate his rights, that if he wants a 
lawyer, then we will stop any kind of questioning with him, that we weren’t going to 
pursue the matter unless we have it clarified is he asking for a lawyer or is he just 
making a comment about a lawyer, and he said, “No, I’m not asking for a lawyer,” 
and then he continued on, and said, “No, I don’t want a lawyer,” and then he said he 
didn’t kill the guy and he said that he was the type of person that if he did kill the 
guy, he’d have to tell someone about it. 
United States v. Davis, 36 M.J. 337, 339–40 (C.M.A. 1993). 
189. Davis, 36 M.J. at 340. 
190. Id. at 341. 
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request for counsel by the investigators as “good police practice,” the 
Supreme Court held that such a clarification is unnecessary.191  The 
Court gave no reason for this other than there was no requirement for 
such a clarification.192  In other words, when a suspect in custody says, “I 
might want an attorney” or something similar, the police may 
completely ignore these words and continue with their questioning.193 
The failure of the Court in Davis to require the “good police 
practice”—of clarifying an ambiguous request for counsel—before the 
police may resume questioning a suspect in custody is, as Justice Souter 
said in his concurring opinion, unfair as well as unwise.194  While the 
reason why the Court would render such a harsh decision can never be 
totally known, it is worth observing that the Court chose to refer, as it 
had in previous cases, to the ‘“rigid’ prophylactic rule of Edwards.”195  
Whether the Court would have rendered a decision like the one in Davis 
had it not embarked on the path it had begun with Edwards and 
continued with Roberson and Minnick toward what it came to regard as 
a “rigid prophylactic rule” is, of course, speculation.  It is fair to ask, 
however, if faced with the extreme reach of the Edwards protections, 
the Court in Bradshaw and Davis was determined to make it difficult for 
defendants to grasp onto such extensive protections.196  One 
commentator noted the effect of Edwards and its progeny by saying: 
[T]he breathtaking scope of the Edwards presumption, extending 
 
191. Davis, 512 U.S. at 461. 
192. Id. 
193. Commenting on such a situation, Professor James Tomkovicz wrote that, “an 
approach that allows agents to disregard completely every unclear assertion seems both 
unnecessarily rigid and oblivious to the reality that decision making is not always an 
instantaneous, all-or-nothing process.”  Tomkovicz, supra note 30, at 1011–12.  
194. Davis, 512 U.S. at 467 (Souter, J., concurring). 
195. Id. at 458 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (quoting Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 
91, 95 (1984); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979)). 
196. While Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044 (1983), was decided before the 
Court’s decisions in Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988), and Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 
U.S. 146 (1990), it still followed creation of the special initiation protection in Edwards v. 
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981), and the characterization of it as rigid in Fare, 442 U.S. 
707, 718 (1979).  Davis, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) was handed down after the Court expanded the 
Edwards protection in Roberson and Minnick.  
 When considering the series of cases after Miranda in which the Court diminished the 
Miranda protections by referring to them as “prophylactic,” see, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 
467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984); United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 689 (4th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 
530 U.S. 428, 437–38 (2000), one commentator characterized the holding in Edwards as 
“striden[t],” Barton, supra note 39, at 485.  In Maryland v. Shatzer, the Court referred to the 
same holding as the “Edwards’ super-prophylactic rule.”  130 S. Ct. 1213, 1221 n.3 (2010). 
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to questioning by other jurisdictions, encompassing the 
discussion of unrelated matters, and possessing no articulated 
durational limitation, threatens to pressure courts to discharge 
the mandate of Edwards in a begrudging and potentially 
undermining manner.  A defendant may be more likely to be 
seen as having insufficiently invoked his right to counsel during 
custodial interrogation.197 
IV. THE MEANING OF A SUSPECT’S INVOCATION OF MIRANDA RIGHTS 
The previous sections examined the Supreme Court’s tortured 
interpretation of Miranda’s landmark Fifth Amendment holding 
regarding the distinction between a suspect’s invocation of her right to 
silence and her right to counsel during custodial interrogation.  In those 
sections I disputed the legal basis for the distinction drawn by the 
Court’s interpretation of Miranda and the Fifth Amendment itself.  This 
section will address the likelihood that a suspect in custody means 
something different when he invokes one right as opposed to the other. 
A. The Distinction Between the Rights to Silence and Counsel Does Not 
Honor the Suspect’s Choice 
The police are required to inform suspects in custodial interrogation 
of their rights to silence and counsel because—as the Court in Miranda 
held—it is the only way to break the coercive atmosphere that attends 
such questioning.198  In cases subsequent to Miranda, the Court held that 
when a suspect invokes his right to counsel the suspect is indicating he is 
utterly helpless to respond to police questioning ever without the 
presence of counsel.199  Invoking the right to silence—according to the 
Court—means only that the suspect wishes not to answer questions at 
that particular point in time.200  Apparently, this is true even if the 
suspect’s invocation of counsel is “I don’t wish to talk until after I 
consult with counsel”201 or if his invocation of the right to silence is, “I 
 
197. Eugene L. Shapiro, Thinking the Unthinkable: Recasting the Presumption of 
Edwards v. Arizona, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 11, 18 (2000).   
198. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 465, 471 (1966). 
199. See, e.g., Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 (1988) (noting that a suspect 
invokes his right to counsel if he “believes that he is not capable of 
undergoing . . . questioning without advice of counsel”).  
200. See Strauss, supra note 71, at 385.  
201. See, e.g., Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 165 (1990). 
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don’t ever want to speak with the police.”202  Given this, it is hard to 
maintain that the distinction drawn by the Court is merely an attempt to 
honor the defendant’s choice.203  
 
202. See, e.g., Williams v. Texas, 257 S.W.3d 426, 433–34 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) (holding 
that law enforcement officers could reinterrogate the defendant even after he invoked his 
right to silence by stating: “I want to terminate everything.” (emphasis added)). 
203. One of the defenses of the dichotomy created between invocations of the right to 
silence and the right to counsel revolves around the idea that one purpose of Miranda was to 
give the suspect the choice as to whether to participate in custodial interrogation.  See 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458.  The dichotomy is said to honor that purpose.  See Michigan v. 
Mosley, 423 U.S. 99, 109–10 (1975).  It would seem that the Court could have honored the 
suspect’s choice one of two ways.  On one hand, the Court could hold that the police must 
discontinue all questioning of a suspect who invokes either his right to silence or his right to 
counsel unless the suspect initiates reinterrogation.  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473–74.  This 
position presumes that a suspect who has invoked one of his Miranda rights and then changes 
his mind about speaking when reapproached by the police is doing so not as a matter of free 
choice, but instead in response to the coercive environment of custodial interrogation.  
Mosley, 423 U.S. at 102.  In the alternative, the Court could decide that if the police wait 
enough time after the suspect invokes a Miranda protection, so as not to badger him, the 
police may attempt to interrogate him again.  Id. at 106.  In such a situation, if the suspect 
changes his mind, the Court could view this as honoring his choice and allow such a statement 
to be used at the suspect’s trial.  Id. at 103–04. 
  The Court chose neither of these paths.  Id. at 102.  Instead it distinguished invocation of 
the right to silence from the right to counsel because the latter demonstrates the helplessness 
of the suspect to handle himself without the protection of counsel; whereas, choosing to 
remain silent does not mean the suspect will choose to remain silent at all future times.  Id. at 
103–04; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471.  The suspect’s request for silence has been honored when 
the police stopped questioning, so they may later resume the questioning without having 
denied the suspect the choice he made when invoking his right to silence.  Mosley, 423 U.S. at 
106.  The suspect saying he wanted an attorney, however, has not had his invocation honored, 
or his choice respected, if the police approach him again absent his having counsel.  Id. at 
109–10.  In summing up this position as to why invocations of silence and counsel are different 
one commentator observed,  
The request for a lawyer is different because it admits a structural disadvantage, the 
very disadvantage at the heart of Miranda’s desire for a level playing field that 
permits free choices in the interrogation room.  In short, the suspect’s autonomy is 
undermined more when the right to counsel is ignored.   
George C. Thomas III & Richard A. Leo, The Effects of Miranda v. Arizona: “Embedded” in 
Our National Culture?, 29 CRIME & JUST. 203, 228 (Michael Tonry ed., 2002).  
 This explanation for the assertion that application of the Mosley–Edwards dichotomy to 
reinterrogation respects the suspect’s choice to invoke silence or counsel is highly debatable 
for several reasons.  Regarding invocation of the right to counsel, the holding in Davis—
which permitted government agents to ignore ambiguous invocations of the right to counsel 
and therefore does not require the agents clarify the suspect’s actual choice regarding 
whether he wanted counsel present—suggests that honoring the suspect’s choice is not at the 
heart of the Edwards protection.  Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).  Regarding 
invocation of the right to silence, the fact that a suspect’s expressed or implied choice not to 
speak with the police—invocation of the right to silence—can be overcome by application of 
the factors enumerated in Mosley suggests the same lack of concern for the suspect’s choice.  
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It is important then to understand what, if any, real difference exists 
when the custodial suspect invokes the right to counsel, rather than the 
right to silence.  It is the domination that accompanies being removed 
from friends and family and placed in complete police control, 
combined with the pressure placed on suspects to respond to police 
questioning, that provides the compulsion necessary to trigger the 
protections of the Fifth Amendment.204  In such a coercive situation, 
according to the Court, the suspect is expressing a desire for completely 
different treatment when he invokes his right to counsel than when he 
invokes his right to silence.205 
The Edwards principle, as described in Roberson, is that a suspect 
who invokes his right to counsel is manifesting his inability to ever deal 
with police questioning without an attorney being present.206  This, 
according to the Court, is a different and more permanent helplessness 
than that manifested by the suspect who invokes his right to silence.207  
The Court offers no support for the characterization it places on the 
words of such a suspect.  It is incumbent, therefore, to examine whether 
support for the attachment of these meanings to the suspect’s invocation 
of the two rights exists. 
Several assumptions undergird the distinction the Court created 
here.  The first assumption is that the suspect in this coercive 
environment is intending to say something different when he invokes 
the right to silence than when he invokes the right to counsel.208  Either 
 
See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 110 n.2 (White, J., concurring).  Perhaps most profoundly, the 
interpretations of Mosley by lower courts—which have legitimated police tactics of 
reapproaching suspects in manners that clearly demonstrate badgering and therefore nullify 
free choice—are further evidence that real freedom of choice is not served by the dichotomy.  
See infra notes 222–35 and accompanying text; see also Strauss, supra note 71, at 385 
(observing that if preserving choice is the goal, “the results in Mosley and Edwards are likely 
irreconcilable”).  
204. See Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1219 (2010) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 
456–57, 467 (1966)) (referring to the “‘inherently compelling pressures’ of custodial 
interrogation,” the “‘incommunicado interrogation’ in an ‘unfamiliar,’ ‘police-dominated 
atmosphere,’” and discussing “pressures ‘which work to undermine the individual’s will to 
resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely’”).  
205. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473–74. 
206. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 480 (1981); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 
675, 686 (1988). 
207. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484. 
208. But see Strauss, supra note 71, at 385 (“In essence, the justification for permitting 
reinterrogation when the suspect invokes the right to remain silent, but not when he invokes 
the right to counsel, is weak at best.  In both cases, the subject is telling the police that he 
chooses not to cooperate or assist in the investigation.  The accused is as emphatic when 
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of these invocations requires the police to stop their questioning.  The 
defendant is aware of this because he is told that the questioning will 
resume only if he waives both rights.209  Thus, he probably knows by 
claiming either right, he will achieve his immediate end, which is to stop 
the questioning.  It requires a leap of faith to believe that a suspect in 
custodial interrogation means something different when invoking his 
right to counsel as opposed to his right to silence given his likely 
understanding that either will achieve his goal of preventing subsequent 
questioning.210  This is true for both the first time arrestee—who may not 
be aware of his ability to stop questioning until he receives his 
warnings—and for those more experienced with the criminal justice 
system, in other words, those who know that questioning will in fact 
cease if they invoke either right. 
It is useful to bear in mind that the legal ramifications of the 
invocation of the right to counsel have nothing to do with the 
defendant’s representation by counsel at trial or during other aspects of 
the adversarial process.  That right is protected by the Sixth 
Amendment.211  The right to counsel protected under the Fifth 
Amendment, as identified in Miranda, deals only with the right to 
counsel in situations of custodial interrogation.212  Perhaps more 
important is that the suspect generally understands this reality (that the 
right to counsel here pertains to the police questioning) even though he 
is unlikely to know the legal reason why.  Some incarnations of the 
Miranda warnings explicitly say that the suspect has the right to counsel 
both before and during police questioning, while others imply it in one 
 
insisting he will not speak as when he declines to speak without his attorney.”)  
209. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444–45. 
210. See Kamisar, supra note 152, at 157; see also Thrutchley, supra note 109, at 197.  As 
Yale Kamisar says: 
The average person has no idea that different procedural safeguards are triggered 
by saying “I want to see a lawyer” (or “I don’t want to say anything until I see a 
lawyer”) rather than “I don’t want to say anything” (or “I don’t want to talk to 
you”).  If, after being advised both of his right to remain silent and his right to 
counsel, a suspect replies that he wishes to remain silent, he may really be saying 
that he wants to remain silent until he sees a lawyer.  Indeed, I would argue that if, 
immediately after being informed of his right to remain silent and his right to 
counsel, the suspect responds “I don’t want to say anything” he is invoking both 
rights.   
Kamisar, supra note 152, at 157 (emphasis omitted).   
211. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
212. See supra text accompanying notes 27–34; Barton, supra note 39, at 485 (citing 
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485–86 (1981)). 
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way or another.213  With this knowledge in hand, the defendant likely 
knows that the invocation of either right will stop the questioning. 
What the defendant is very unlikely to know, however, lies at the 
heart of the second assumption that supports differential treatment of 
invocation of the rights to silence and counsel.  Few suspects will know 
that an uncounseled suspect can be reinterrogated after he invokes 
silence, but cannot be reinterrogated after invoking counsel except if he 
initiates discussion of the crime.214  Unlike the Miranda requirement that 
a suspect in custody be told that he has the right to stop all questioning 
by invoking silence or counsel, there is no requirement that a suspect be 
told the difference in invoking the two rights created by the holdings in 
Mosley and Edwards.  It stretches credulity to think that a suspect is 
ever told of this distinction by the police.  Without such knowledge, it is 
clear that the suspect’s decision regarding which Miranda right to invoke 
is not based on his desire to avoid reinterrogation in one instance and 
permit it later in the other.  This realization leads to the conclusion that 
the Mosley/Edwards distinction does not exist to preserve the choice of 
 
213. While the warnings must contain the four essentials enumerated in Miranda, the 
Court has permitted nuanced, different wordings of the warnings.  See, e.g., Duckworth v. 
Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 202–03 (1989) (holding that Miranda advisement need not be given in 
the exact form described in the Miranda decision and that it is enough that the advisement 
reasonably conveys the Miranda rights to a suspect); California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 355–
57 (1981) (holding that while the warnings must contain the four essential elements set forth 
in Miranda, the warnings need not be a virtual incantation of the precise language in Miranda, 
and different wordings of the warnings are permitted).  Accordingly, different law 
enforcement authorities have used slightly different versions of the warnings.  An example of 
many such versions is:   
You have the right to remain silent.  Anything you say can be used against you in 
court.  You have a right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any 
questions, and to have him with you during questioning.  You have this right to the 
advice and presence of a lawyer even if you cannot afford to hire one.  We have no 
way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and 
when you go to court.  If you wish to answer questions now without a lawyer 
present, you have the right to stop answering questions at any time.  You also have 
the right to stop answering at any time until you’ve talked to a lawyer. 
Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 198 (emphasis omitted).  To examine how versions may differ, 
compare Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 198, with Prysock, 453 U.S. at 356–57. 
214. This would require the suspect to have knowledge of the Mosley–Edwards 
dichotomy with respect to the different requirements for reinterrogation of suspects who 
invoke the right to silence and those invoking their counsel right, and perhaps, depending on 
the custodial situation involved, also the extensions of the Edwards protection in Roberson 
(to different crimes) and Minnick (even after the suspect has met with counsel).  It states the 
obvious to say that this is highly unlikely.  See Kamisar, supra note 152, at 157; Strauss, supra 
note 71, at 385; Thrutchley, supra note 109, at 197.  
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the suspect regarding his submission to later reinterrogation.215 
B. Invocations of the Rights to Silence and Counsel are Equally 
Threatened by Police Badgering 
If the distinction the Court draws between invocations of the right to 
silence and the right to counsel cannot be supported by the notion of 
honoring the choice of a suspect, what remains in support of this 
distinction is the idea that the suspect who invokes counsel is being 
badgered if the police reinitiate questioning of him in the absence of 
counsel, but is not being badgered if he is reinterrogated after invoking 
his right to silence.  In several post-Edwards decisions, the Court made 
clear that the Court’s intent in Edwards was to prohibit badgering 
arising from uncounseled, police-initiated reinterrogations.216  In 
Michigan v. Harvey,217 the Court wrote, “Edwards thus established 
another prophylactic rule designed to prevent police from badgering a 
defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights.”218  In 
Minnick, the Court quoted this language approvingly and added, “The 
rule ensures that any statement made in subsequent interrogation is not 
the result of coercive pressures.”219  In Roberson, the Court asserted that 
once a suspect invokes his right to counsel, it is presumed that any 
subsequent waiver is the product of “inherently compelling pressures,”220 
and that postinvocation questioning, even three days later about a 
separate crime, “will surely exacerbate whatever compulsion to speak 
the suspect may be feeling.”221 
It may very well be true that postinvocation questioning of suspects 
who invoke their right to counsel exacerbates compulsion, but if so, 
there is no reason why that is not equally true of the suspect who has 
invoked his right to silence.  Several commentators have noted that the 
risk of coercion for a suspect who invokes his right to silence while in 
custody is every bit as substantial as one who invokes the right to 
counsel.222  A review of cases illustrates that suspects can be badgered 
 
215. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
216. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 (1990); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 
(1990); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988). 
217. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344. 
218. Id. at 350. 
219. Minnick, 498 U.S. at 151. 
220. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 681 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)). 
221. Id. at 686. 
222. Thomas, supra note 203, at 228 (arguing that the risk of compulsion is the same 
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into waiving their previously invoked right to silence and that the 
holding in Mosley does little to avoid this badgering. 
In Grant v. Warden,223 the defendant was taken to the hospital for 
surgery.224  “The first interview began at 4:26 a.m., just after [the] 
surgery. . . .  Detectives [told Grant] that they wanted to talk with [him] 
about his mother-in-law and attempted to advise [him] of his [Miranda] 
rights,” but ended the interview because Grant “was not coherent.”225  
When a second interview was “attempted at 9:51 a.m., another 
detective . . . explained [to Grant] that he was investigating the . . . case 
and advised Grant of his Miranda rights.”226  Next, Grant stated that “his 
throat was sore” and “he did not want to talk.”227  At 11:45 a.m., one of 
the detectives returned and again advised the defendant of his Miranda 
rights.228  Again, “Grant . . . [responded] that he did not want to talk 
because his throat was sore and indicated that he could not write 
because his hands were sore.”229  Again, at 1:42 p.m., the detective 
returned and readvised Grant of his Miranda rights.230  The defendant 
“acknowledged his rights” and the following conversation took place: 
Detective: Okay.  Now, having all those rights which I just 
explained to you in mind, do you wish to answer questions at this 
time? 
Grant: No. 
Detective: What’s that? 
Grant: No. 
Detective: No? 
Grant: (inaudible) answer any questions. 
Detective: What’s that? 
Grant: I don’t want to answer any questions. 
Detective: You don’t want to answer any questions? 
 
regardless of whether the defendant invokes the right to silence or the right to counsel); 
Wolff, supra note 83, at 1180 (calling the distinction “illogical” and asserting that the risk of 
coercion is equal for both the right to silence and the right to counsel). 
223. Grant v. Warden, 616 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Grant v. 
Barnhart, 131 S. Ct. 948 (2011). 
224. Id. at 73. 
225. Id. at 73–74. 
226. Id. 
227. Id.  
228. Id. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. 
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Grant: No.231 
The next morning, at 9:03 a.m., “after learning from Grant’s nurses 
that he had not been given pain medication since the previous 
afternoon,” the detective again advised Grant of his rights, and this time 
Grant agreed to talk.232  The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
upheld the state supreme court’s finding that the officers scrupulously 
honored the defendant’s right to silence.233 
After Grant expressed doubts about whether to continue the 
questioning during the 9:03 am interview, the Detective stated, “I’m not 
here twisting your arm or anything.  You know there are certain things 
that we obviously . . . we obviously know . . . .  You know that this is 
what we do for a living.”234  Grant argued that the detective badgered 
him into waiving his right to remain silent.235  In rejecting this argument, 
the First Circuit adopted the reasoning of the court below with respect 
to badgering: 
 In the matter before us, the record establishes that the police 
immediately ceased their questioning of Grant when he invoked 
his Miranda right to remain silent during the 1:42 p.m. 
interrogation.  They did not speak to him through the remainder 
of the afternoon and evening, and did not return until 9:03 a.m. 
the following day.  It is also clear that, when questioning did 
resume, Grant was given fresh Miranda warnings, which he 
acknowledged that he understood.  The subject matter of the 
police questioning at 9:03 a.m. on the day after Grant invoked his 
Miranda right to remain silent was the same as it had been the 
previous day.   
 Given these facts, we have no difficulty saying that two of the 
four factors militate in favor of a conclusion that Grant’s 
invocation of his right to remain silent was scrupulously honored: 
(1) questioning ceased as soon as Grant invoked his right to 
remain silent without further badgering or pressure to speak, and 
(2) Grant was given fresh warnings before being questioned 
again.236 
 
231. Id. 
232. Id. 
233. Id. at 78, 80. 
234. Id. at 74. 
235. See id. at 78. 
236. State v. Grant, 939 A.2d 93, 106 (Me. 2008). 
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In Jackson v. Dugger,237 “Jackson was arrested by the Florida 
Highway Patrol at 11:39 a.m. . . . and invoked his right to remain silent 
after being given his Miranda warnings.”238  Forty-five minutes to an 
hour later, another detective arrived and readvised Jackson of his 
Miranda rights.239  Three hours later, Jackson was again advised of his 
Miranda rights and again asserted his right to remain silent.240  In total, 
Dade County officials advised Jackson of his rights four more times over 
the next six hours.241  At 6:15 p.m., Jackson made a statement giving the 
location of the victim’s body.242  Jackson then indicated that he desired 
counsel, but law enforcement officials did not provide him with an 
attorney.243  Subsequently, Jackson gave a formal written confession.244  
The state trial court concluded that the formal written confession was 
inadmissible but allowed all statements made prior to Jackson’s request 
for counsel.245  On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
also found that Jackson’s right to silence was scrupulously honored.246  
The court reasoned that because a significant period of time (six hours) 
passed between the first invocation of the right to remain silent and the 
time of the confession, Jackson’s right to silence was scrupulously 
honored.247  The court also noted that the repeated advisement of 
Miranda rights merely showed that the police were diligent in informing 
Jackson of his rights, not that the police were attempting to coerce 
Jackson into confessing.248 
In Lanosa v. Frank,249 the defendant was sitting in a stolen car when 
he was arrested.250  At 7:30 a.m. the next morning, Detective Silva 
advised Lanosa of his rights and gave him a Miranda waiver form.251  At 
 
237. Jackson v. Dugger, 837 F.2d 1469 (11th Cir. 1988). 
238. Id. at 1471. 
239. Id.  
240. Id. 
241. Id. 
242. Id. 
243. Id. 
244. Id. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. 
247. Id. at 1472. 
248. Id. 
249. Lanosa v. Frank, No. 07-00115, 2007 WL 2746839 (D. Haw. Sept. 17, 2007), aff’d, 
304 F.App’x. 565 (9th Cir. 2008). 
250. Id. at *4.  
251. Id. 
10 - GROSSMAN FINAL PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 12/28/2012  11:07 AM 
188 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [96:151 
7:50 a.m., Lanosa indicated on the form that he understood his rights, 
but said that “he did not want to talk,” at which point the interrogation 
ended.252  When the Detective stepped out of the room, he overheard 
another detective, Detective Lee, “discussing a separate 
investigation.”253  Upon hearing this discussion, Silva told Lee that 
Lanosa “might fit the description of the suspect he was looking for in 
connection with various sexual assaults and burglaries.”254  A mere ten 
minutes later, at 8:00 a.m., “Lee moved [Lanosa] to another room and 
started an interrogation about the sexual assaults and burglaries,” with 
Detective Silva present.255  Before the second interrogation, Lanosa was 
given a new copy of the Miranda waiver form and readvised of his 
Miranda rights by Lee.256  Within twelve minutes, Lanosa again indicated 
that he understood his rights by signing the appropriate portion of the 
waiver form.  At 8:40 a.m., Lanosa signed the portion of the waiver form 
indicating that he waived his rights; however, he did not make a 
statement “and asked if he could return to his cell to think.”257  The court 
regarded this request as another invocation of Lanosa’s right to 
silence.258  Upon Lanosa’s request, the interrogation was ended and he 
was returned to his cell.259  Two hours later, at 10:40 a.m., a third 
detective, Detective Holokai, retrieved Lanosa from his cell to question 
him about an unrelated burglary.260  Before Detective Holokai had a 
chance to begin the interrogation, Detective Lee interrupted “and 
initiated a third interrogation.”261  At that time Lee again advised 
Lanosa of his Miranda rights, presented him a copy of the Miranda 
waiver, which he had signed during the prior interrogation with 
Detective Lee, and asked Lanosa if was willing to talk.262  At 10:50 a.m., 
Lanosa filled out a voluntary statement form and made incriminating 
statements in response to Lee’s questions about the sexual assaults and 
burglaries.263 
 
252. Id. 
253. Id.  
254. Id.  
255. Id. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. 
258. Id. at *6.  
259. Id. at *4.  
260. Id. at *5. 
261. Id. 
262. Id. 
263. Id. 
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The Court held that Lanosa’s right to silence was scrupulously 
honored based primarily on the fact that Lanosa was given fresh 
Miranda warnings before each interrogation.264  While Lanosa 
contended that the ten minutes between the first two interrogations was 
not a reasonable amount of time under Mosley, the court stated that the 
time between the interrogations must be taken as a whole, and thus the 
total of two hours and ten minutes between the three interrogations was 
sufficient to show that Lanosa’s invocation of his right to silence had 
been scrupulously honored.265  It is thus apparent that the effects of 
police badgering are every bit as significant for suspects who invoke 
their right to silence as for those who invoke their right to counsel.  All 
of the assumptions that have been or could be used by the Court to 
support the distinction it has drawn between reinterrogating suspects in 
custody who invoke their right to silence and those who invoke their 
right to counsel are unsupportable.  Similarly, the jurisprudential and 
constitutional justifications offered by the Court in cases that have 
drawn the same distinction are equally flawed.  It is time now to 
consider how the Court can extricate itself from the situation it created 
by establishing and developing this distinction in Mosley, Edwards, and 
subsequent holdings in this area. 
V.  TOWARDS AN APPROACH THAT IS BOTH SIMPLER AND FAIRER 
In the previous Parts, this article argued that the differential 
treatment surrounding the reinterrogation of suspects in custody who 
invoke their right to silence and those who invoke their right to counsel 
is unsupportable both theoretically and pragmatically.  This Section 
examines two recent decisions of the Supreme Court that have paved 
the way towards abandoning this problematic distinction.  It will then 
offer and defend an approach for dealing with custodial suspects who 
invoke their right to silence that is consistent with the Court’s new 
approach regarding suspects who request counsel. 
 
264. Id. at *7. 
265. Id.  For more examples of badgering permitted under Mosley, see Jackson v. 
Wyrick, 730 F.2d 1177, 1178, 1180 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that defendant’s right to silence 
was scrupulously honored when he was questioned four times over a two day period); State v. 
Lewingdon, No. C-790488, 1980 WL 352986, at *3, *11–12 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 24, 1980) 
(holding that the defendant’s right to silence had been scrupulously honored after three 
interrogation sessions, with the defendant confessing less than half an hour after his last 
invocation of the right to silence); Dennis v. State, 561 P.2d 88, 96–97 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1977) (holding the defendant’s statement admissible when he was interrogated four times 
within a twelve hour time period and given nothing to eat during that time). 
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 In Berghuis v. Thompkins266 and Maryland v. Shatzer,267 both 
decided in 2010, the Supreme Court pointed the way towards a means of 
ending this unwarranted Mosley/Edwards distinction.  Neither the 
Thompkins nor the Shatzer Court actually addressed the propriety of 
the distinction between reinterrogation between suspects who invoke 
right to silence and who invoke their right to counsel.268  In both 
decisions, however, this distinction was not relevant to the outcome of 
the case before the Court, so there is no reason to expect that the 
distinction would have been addressed.269  Significantly though, in both 
Thompkins and Shatzer the Court enumerated several ways in which 
invocations of the right to silence deserve similar treatment to 
invocations of the right to counsel and identified the purposes behind 
these rights that also apply to both invocations.270  Then, in Shatzer, the 
Court developed a new approach for dealing with reinterrogation of 
suspects in custody who invoke the right to counsel that works equally 
well for suspects in custody who invoke the right to silence.271 
A. Berghuis v. Thompkins 
Two related, but analytically severable, issues were before the Court 
in Thompkins.  The first was whether the defendant’s silence during the 
interrogation served as an invocation of his right to silence under 
Miranda.272  The second issue concerned whether Thompkins waived his 
right to silence by answering police questions without ever directly 
acknowledging he understood his Miranda rights.273  After being given 
his Miranda rights, Thompkins never expressly invoked them nor did he 
ever directly waive them.274  In fact, Thompkins remained largely silent 
during a three-hour interrogation by the police regarding his 
participation in a murder.275  About two hours and forty-five minutes 
 
266. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010). 
267. Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010). 
268. See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2259–60, 2263–64; Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1223. 
269. See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2260 (dealing with what constitutes invocation of the 
right to silence; Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1217 (addressing whether the Edwards protection was 
eternal). 
270. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2260; Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1219–20. 
271. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1223. 
272. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2259. 
273. Id. at 2260. 
274. Id. at 2262. 
275. Id. at 2256.  During the interrogation Thompkins gave “a few limited verbal 
responses, however, such as ‘yeah,’ ‘no,’ or ‘I don’t know[]’ [a]nd on occasion he 
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into the interrogation, Thompkins was asked if he believed in God and 
whether he prayed to God to forgive him for the shooting.276  He 
answered, “yes” to both questions, and these words were admitted 
against Thompkins at his trial.277  Thompkins argued to the Supreme 
Court that the admission of these statements at trial violated his right to 
silence.278 
The Court ruled both that Thompkins never invoked his right to 
silence, and that he affirmatively waived his rights under Miranda.279  
Regarding the first issue, the Court held that to invoke one’s right to 
silence during custodial interrogation, the defendant must make an 
unambiguous manifestation of his intent.280  It concluded that 
Thompkins’ silence was not an unambiguous manifestation.281  On the 
waiver issue, Thompkins argued that previous cases had made clear that 
silence plus a statement regarding the crime does not constitute a waiver 
of one’s Miranda rights.282  The Court rejected Thompkins’ argument, 
holding that a waiver need not be express in order to satisfy the 
requirements emanating from Miranda.283  As long as the waiver is 
knowing and voluntary, it satisfies the requirements of the Fifth 
Amendment and Miranda, according to the Court.284  The Court said 
that, in this case, Thompkins’ statement was not the product of police 
coercion and was made only after he had full knowledge of his right to 
remain silent.285  In so holding, the Court maintained that the absence of 
any indication that Thompkins did not understand his rights after having 
them administered, in combination with his voluntary choice to respond 
to a police question, demonstrated that he had waived his rights.286  
Speaking for four Justices in dissent, Justice Sotomayor expressed it 
 
communicated by nodding his head.”  Id. at 2256–57. 
276. Id. at 2257. 
277. Id. 
278. Id. at 2259. 
279. Id. at 2260, 2262. 
280. Id. at 2259–60. 
281. Id. at 2260. 
282. See id. 
283. Id. at 2261. 
284. Id. at 2260. 
285. Id. at 2262–63. 
286. Id. at 2262.  The Court noted that Thompkins read the warnings, and “read aloud 
the fifth warning, which stated that ‘you have the right to decide at any time before or during 
questioning to use your right to remain silent and your right to talk with a lawyer while you 
are being questioned,’” and therefore was aware that police would have to honor his right to 
silence and to counsel during the whole course of the interrogation.  Id. 
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strange that one has to speak in order to assert his right not to speak.287  
Additionally, she maintained that the majority opinion ignored previous 
decisions that held that silence plus a statement about the crime does 
not constitute a waiver, and that holding otherwise violates the explicit 
language of Miranda requiring the government to meet a “heavy 
burden” to show a waiver of the Miranda protections.288 
B. Maryland v. Shatzer 
Maryland v. Shatzer addressed the issue of whether the protection 
conferred upon suspects who invoke their right to counsel during 
custodial interrogation is interminable.289  As discussed above, the Court 
held in Edwards that once a suspect requests counsel during custodial 
interrogation, he cannot be questioned again about the crime while in 
custody unless counsel is present or the defendant initiates the 
questioning.290  In Shatzer, the Court confronted a situation in which the 
authorities interrogated the defendant about the sexual abuse of his 
son—2 1/2 years after he invoked his right to counsel when first 
questioned about the incident.291  The Court ruled that the 2 1/2 year 
break in custody between the two interrogations was sufficient to 
obviate the need for the Edwards initiation protection to continue to 
exist.292 
There were several notable aspects to the Court’s decision in 
Shatzer.  First, the Court considered whether the fact that Shatzer spent 
2 1/2 years between interrogations as a prisoner in the state correctional 
system constituted a break in custody.293  The Court held that because 
being part of a general prison population did not produce the same 
coercive police pressures as custodial interrogation, Shatzer’s time in 
prison could be viewed as a break in custody for purposes of 
determining whether the protections of Edwards were applicable.294  
 
287. Id. at 2266 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
288. See id. at 2269. 
289. See Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1217 (2010); see also supra note 91 and 
accompanying text.  
290. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981). 
291. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1217–18. 
292. Id. at 1223. 
293. Id. at 1224. 
294. Id. at 1224–25.  In Howes v. Field, the Court made it even more difficult for a 
suspect already in prison to have his interrogation determined to be custodial (and therefore 
be entitled to the protections of Miranda), even when the questioning goes on for hours and is 
conducted in an interrogation room.  132 S. Ct. 1181, 1190–92 (2012). 
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Next, the Court reasoned that when a suspect is no longer in custody, he 
has the opportunity to consult with family, friends, and counsel in an 
atmosphere far different than the pressures that accompany custodial 
interrogations.295  After such a break in custody, the Court held, a 
defendant’s change of mind regarding speaking with the police without 
counsel while in custody is less likely to be attributable to the police 
badgering that Edwards was designed to prevent.296  Having reached this 
conclusion, the Court next considered how to determine when such a 
break in custody obviates the need for the Edwards protection.297  The 
Court chose to come up with a fixed period of fourteen days, as the 
minimum period of time for which the break in custody will permit the 
government to initiate the reinterrogation of an uncounseled defendant 
now back in custody.298 
C. Undercutting the Distinction Between the Rights to Silence and 
Counsel 
In both the Thompkins and Shatzer decisions, the Court drew 
several conclusions that significantly undercut the distinction between 
the requirements for reinterrogating a suspect who invokes his right to 
silence during custodial interrogation and a suspect who invokes his 
right to counsel.299  In Davis v. United States, the Court held that to 
invoke one’s right to counsel, the invocation must be unambiguous.300  
Prior to the decision in Thompkins, the Court had never applied that 
same principle to the invocation of the right to silence.301  In doing so the 
Thompkins Court wrote, “[T]here is no principled reason to adopt 
different standards for determining when an accused has invoked the 
Miranda right to remain silent and the Miranda right to counsel.”302  In 
elucidating its reasons for treating the two invocations the same way, the 
Court made clear that the similarities between the invocations of the 
two rights go beyond that one issue.303  The Court quoted approvingly 
from what it wrote twenty-six years earlier in another case: “‘[M]uch of 
 
295. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1221. 
296. Id. 
297. Id. at 1222. 
298. Id. at 1227. 
299. See id. at 1219–20; Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010). 
300. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994). 
301. See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2260. 
302. Id. 
303. Id. 
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the logic and language of [Mosley],’ which discussed the Miranda right 
to remain silent, ‘could be applied to the invocation of the [Miranda 
right to counsel].’”304  The Court then noted another similarity between 
invocation of the two rights—that in protecting the Fifth Amendment 
right against compulsory self-incrimination, an invocation of either right 
compels the police to end an interrogation.305 
Not only are the standards for invocation of the Miranda rights to 
silence and counsel the same, but so too—according to the Court—are 
the requirements to show that each right has been waived.306  The 
decision in Thompkins speaks to how Miranda rights can be validly 
waived implicitly as well as explicitly.307  At one point the Court 
observed that, “Miranda rights can therefore be waived through means 
less formal than a typical waiver on the record in a courtroom given the 
practical constraints and necessities of interrogation and the fact that 
Miranda’s main protection lies in advising defendants of their rights.”308  
The fact that the Court here is not distinguishing between the right to 
silence and the right to counsel is clear from the words themselves as 
well as the fact that it cites to Davis, a case addressing the right to 
counsel.  Similarly, the Court in Thompkins noted that a suspect in 
custody might revoke his or her waiver at any time.309  In such a 
circumstance, “[i]f the right to counsel or the right to remain silent is 
invoked at any point during questioning, further interrogation must 
cease.”310 
An important thread woven through the Shatzer opinion relates to 
the impact of continued custody on the suspect regarding 
reinterrogation and the importance of his being able to make an 
uncoerced choice as to whether he wishes to respond to police 
questions.311  In referring to suspects in custody who invoke their right to 
 
304. Id. (quoting Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 648 (1984)). 
305. Id. (citing Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103 (1975); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 
707, 718 (1979)). 
306. Id. (noting that waiver of Miranda rights must be both voluntary and made with 
awareness of the nature of the right and the consequences of waiver). 
307. Id. at 2261. 
308. Id. at 2262 (citation omitted). 
309. Id. at 2263. 
310. Id. at 2263–64. 
311. Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1220 (2010); see also Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 
2264.  The Court noted in Thompkins: 
Interrogation provides the suspect with additional information that can put his or 
her decision to waive, or not to invoke, into perspective.  As questioning commences 
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counsel, the Shatzer Court noted that requests to reinterrogate such 
suspects “pose a significantly greater risk of coercion” than does the 
initial attempt to interrogate those suspects.312  Although the Court in 
Shatzer was dealing with—and therefore referring to—a defendant who 
had invoked his right to counsel, the risk of greater coercion it was 
referring to certainly should apply in a similar manner to the 
reinterrogation of suspects who invoke their right to silence.  This is 
clear from the Court’s explanation of the greater risk: “That increased 
risk results not only from the police’s persistence in trying to get the 
suspect to talk, but also from the continued pressure that begins when 
the individual is taken into custody as a suspect and sought to be 
interrogated—pressure likely to ‘increase as custody is prolonged.’”313  
The Court later refers to the “mounting coercive pressures” of 
continued police custody.314  It seems beyond dispute that regardless of 
whether one invokes his right to silence or counsel, the risks of 
prolonged custody, described by the Court above, pertain.315 
The Court in Shatzer returned to familiar themes concerning the 
precise nature of the coercion referred to above that attends custodial 
interrogation and particularly the time between when questioning is cut 
off and the next interrogation.316  Referring to the right to counsel that 
was invoked in Shatzer, the Court spoke of how a suspect could be 
badgered into changing his mind about speaking with the police during 
continued uninterrupted custody.317  The Court quoted Miranda 
regarding how a suspect in custody is separated from friends and family, 
 
and then continues, the suspect has the opportunity to consider the choices he or she 
faces and to make a more informed decision, either to insist on silence or to 
cooperate.  When the suspect knows that Miranda rights can be invoked at any time, 
he or she has the opportunity to reassess his or her immediate and long-term 
interests. 
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2264. 
312. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1220. 
313. Id. (quoting Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990)). 
314. Id.  
315. Before the holding in Shatzer, several commentators had already asserted that any 
statement made after a custodial suspect invokes his right to silence is just as likely to be the 
product of impermissible police coercion as a statement from the suspect who asks for 
counsel.  See, e.g., Barton, supra note 39, at 487; Dripps, supra note 32, at 16; Thomas, supra 
note 203, at 228; Wolff, supra note 83, at 1180.  
316. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1222–23 (discussing different lengths of time sufficient to 
relieve a suspect of the inherent coercion of being in custody and concluding that fourteen 
days suffices to eliminate its coercive effects as well as deter police abuse of the break-in-
custody rule).   
317. Id. at 1220. 
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isolated and placed in an unfamiliar environment controlled totally by 
the police.318  Such pressures are undoubtedly present for the suspect in 
custody who has invoked the right to silence as well as for the suspect 
who has invoked his right to counsel.319  
The Shatzer Court then discussed Edwards, Roberson, and Minnick: 
three cases in which the police waited a substantial period of time after 
the suspect’s invocation of his right to counsel (overnight in Edwards, 
three days in Roberson, and two days in Minnick) and in which the 
suspect was still in custody to attempt to reinterrogate him.320  Even with 
the extended period of time between when questioning was cut off and 
when it was resumed in those cases, the Court in Shatzer concluded that, 
“[n]one of these suspects regained a sense of control or normalcy after 
they were initially taken into custody for the crime under 
investigation.”321  In other words, no matter how long the police wait to 
reinterrogate a suspect who had invoked his right to counsel, his 
continued, uninterrupted custody makes any future response the likely 
result of the coercive custodial environment and, thus, inadmissible 
under Miranda.322  Surely Mosley was not able to regain his sense of 
“control or normalcy”323 during the much briefer two hours he spent in 
uninterrupted police custody after he invoked his right to silence.324  This 
is even more obvious for other defendants whose statements have been 
allowed into evidence based on an interrogation conducted after as few 
as ten minutes following invocation of the same Fifth Amendment 
protection.325  Even if one credits the dubious distinction between 
invocation of the right to silence and the right to counsel the Court 
created in the Mosley–Edwards line of cases, the coercive pressures of 
prolonged custody and subsequent interrogation discussed above are 
 
318. Id. 
319. Id. (noting that to counteract the coercive nature of custody, defendants must be 
informed of their rights to both silence and counsel); id. at 1229 (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(noting that police may coerce a suspect into abandoning his right to silence or his right to 
counsel).  
320. Id. at 1221 (majority opinion). 
321. Id.  
322. Id. at 1220–21. 
323. Id. 
324. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975).  At any rate, it is disingenuous to 
pretend that the longer amount of time a suspect spends in custody—regardless of how much 
time elapses between interrogations—the less pressure he will feel to speak.  
325. See, e.g., Lanosa v. Frank, No. 07-00115, 2007 WL 2746839, at *7 (D. Haw. Sept. 17, 
2007), aff’d, 304 F. App’x. 565, 566 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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similar regardless of which right is invoked. 
With respect to invocations of the right to counsel, the solution to 
the problems discussed above is to prohibit further police custodial 
interrogation unless the suspect initiates or has counsel present.326  The 
Supreme Court had never before held that a break in custody before 
resuming custodial interrogation could permit a second attempt at 
uncounseled questioning of a suspect who invokes his right to counsel.327  
Similarly, the Court had never before held that there was a period of 
time between invocation of the right to counsel and a second attempt at 
uncounseled custodial interrogation (regardless of whether the suspect 
remained in custody), which if long enough, would allow the police to 
reinterrogate the suspect.328  Both of these alternatives to the 
interminable nature of the Edwards protection were before the Court in 
Shatzer.329  The Court in Shatzer chose the first alternative, holding that 
a break in custody of sufficient length reduces the risk that any 
interrogation of the suspect made once he is back in custody is likely to 
be the product of the coercion.330 
In adopting this new approach to permissible police activity once a 
suspect invokes his right to counsel during custodial interrogation, the 
Court had two basic questions to answer.  First, why does a break in 
custody obviate the need for the Edwards protections and, second, what 
is the minimum amount of time necessary for the break between 
invocation and subsequent custodial interrogation?  The Court’s 
responses to these questions demonstrates quite clearly why and how 
the approach to what type of interrogation is permitted after invocation 
of Miranda’s right to silence needs to be changed as well. 
When a suspect is freed from custody, he no longer suffers from the 
isolation and police-dominated atmosphere that warrants the 
 
326. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981).  For examples of the application 
of Edwards, see Van Hook v. Anderson, 488 F.3d 411, 425–26 (6th Cir. 2007) (allowing 
reinterrogation after the invocation of the right to counsel where defendant initiated the 
conversation); People v. Wright, 651 N.E.2d 758, 764 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (holding same); 
Osburn v. State, 326 S.W.3d 771, 781–82 (Ark. 2009) (suppressing defendant’s statement 
made after invocation of the right to counsel when counsel was not present and defendant did 
not initiate the conversation). 
327. See Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1223. 
328. Id. at 1223. 
329. Id. at 1222 & n.4 (referring to the second argument and noting that there was no 
need to address it because the government prevailed on the first argument). 
330. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1223. 
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protections enumerated in Miranda and subsequent cases.331  As the 
Court in Shatzer pointed out, the suspect is free to speak with friends, 
family or an attorney as he wishes.332  Therefore, the coercion produced 
by keeping the suspect in the isolated atmosphere of custody, especially 
if that custody is prolonged, has likely been dissipated when he was 
released.333  It follows then, that if returned to custody after his release, 
any waiver of Miranda rights that precedes a new attempt at 
interrogation is less likely to be the product of the police having worn 
down the suspect’s resistance.  In the Court’s words, “His change of 
 
331. See United States v. Harris, 221 F.3d 1048, 1053 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that a 
three-hour break in custody was sufficient because defendant “had ample opportunity to 
consult his family, friends, or a lawyer”); Dunkins v. Thigpen, 854 F.2d 394, 397 & n.6 (11th 
Cir. 1988) (stating that if the police release the defendant, and the defendant has a reasonable 
opportunity to contact his attorney, there is no reason why Edwards should bar the admission 
of any subsequent statements, and noting that there was no argument that the break in 
custody was contrived or pretextual); Kochutin v. State, 875 P.2d 778, 780 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1994) (holding that a break in custody weighs against presumption of coercion that exists in 
situations of custodial interrogation); In re Bonnie H., 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 513, 526 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1997) (“[A] suspect’s request for counsel during police custodial interrogation followed by a 
termination of questioning and a good faith release of custody, one that is not contrived or 
pretextual on the part of the police, does not prohibit [subsequent] police-initiated 
interrogation.”); People v. Trujillo, 773 P.2d 1086, 1092 (Colo. 1989) (holding that the break 
in custody ends the need for the Edwards protections, but noting that “this analysis will not 
apply if there is any indication that the release of the defendant was contrived, pretextual or 
done in bad faith”); Delaware v. Brotman, CR.A. Nos. IN90-12-1622, IN90-12-1623, 1991 Del. 
Super. LEXIS 277 at *24 (July 11, 1991) (“[R]elease from . . . initial custody 
provided . . . substantial opportunity to speak with those [the defendant] wished to consult.”); 
State v. Bymes, 375 S.E.2d 41, 42 (Ga. 1989) (noting length of break and that “there [was] no 
indication appellee’s release from custody was a mere ploy in order to seek another waiver”); 
Clark v. Maryland, 781 A.2d 913, 947 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) (stating that once a 
defendant is released from police custody into incarceration, the restraints of incarceration 
are no longer coercive and the Edwards protection dissipates); Commonwealth v. Galford, 
597 N.E.2d 410, 414 & n.9 (Mass. 1992) (following the reasoning of United States ex rel. 
Espinoza v. Fairman, 813 F.2d 117 (7th Cir. 1987)), cert. denied sub nom. Galford v. 
Massachusetts, 506 U.S. 1065 (1993); Willie v. Mississippi, 585 So. 2d 660, 667 (Miss. 1991) 
(noting the contrived or pretextual exception, the rationale regarding a defendant’s 
reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney, but noting that “[t]his is not to say that in 
some cases custody may be of such short duration that the Edwards or Roberson protection 
does not dissipate”); Pennsylvania v. Wyatt, 688 A.2d 710, 713 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (stating 
that release from police custody provides the defendant “a substantial opportunity to consult 
with an attorney before any further contact with the police”); Tennessee v. Furlough, 797 
S.W.2d 631, 638 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) (noting that the defendant had a break from 
custody and “had the opportunity to contact an attorney”); Tennessee v. Kyger, 787 S.W.2d 
13, 25 & n.5 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989) (stating that defendant’s release from custody provided 
him with “substantial opportunity to consult with counsel” before the next custodial 
interrogation, and also noting that this was not a contrived or pretextual break). 
332. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1221. 
333. See id. 
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heart is less likely attributable to ‘badgering’ than it is to the fact that 
further deliberation in familiar surroundings has caused him to believe 
(rightly or wrongly) that cooperating with the investigation is in his 
interest.”334  While the Court’s conclusion about why such a suspect is 
choosing to speak with the police is speculative and questionable, it is 
fair to say that the break in custody would seem to make the decision to 
speak less influenced by the result of coercion than if the custody had 
been continuous from the point of time the suspect invoked his right.  If 
this is correct, the police—as the Court holds—should be able to seek a 
waiver of the suspect’s Miranda rights once he’s back in custody and, 
upon obtaining one, be permitted to interrogate the suspect.335 
Having determined that a break in custody can cause the pressures 
of custody to dissipate substantially, and thus allow the police to 
reinterrogate a suspect who had previously invoked his right to counsel, 
the Court then had to determine how long this break in custody had to 
last to achieve this desired effect.  In coming up with a period of 
fourteen days as the minimum length of time for the break in custody to 
allow reinterrogation of such a suspect, the Court rejected the view of 
Justice Stevens that fourteen days was often not long enough to achieve 
its ends, and that in any event, is an entirely arbitrary number.336  Justice 
Stevens (concurring) apparently favored a case-by-case determination 
of whether the duration of the break in custody was long enough.337  The 
Court concluded that fourteen days was sufficient time “for the suspect 
to get reacclimated to his normal life, to consult with friends and 
counsel, and to shake off any residual coercive effects of his prior 
custody.”338  Regarding the contention that fourteen days was an 
arbitrary number, the Court acknowledged that it was unusual for it to 
set such precise time limits regarding police procedures.339  The Court 
noted, however, that it had set such precise limits before, and went on to 
say that setting such time limits was especially appropriate where a 
police procedure was required not by statute, but by Supreme Court 
 
334. Id. 
335. Id. at 1223. 
336. Id. at 1226 (noting that Stevens argues that fourteen days does nothing to eliminate 
the rationale for the Edwards rule, and that the majority gives no good basis for its fourteen-
day rule). 
337. Id. at 1230 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The Court never explains why its rule cannot 
depend on, in addition to a break in custody and passage of time, a concrete event or state of 
affairs, such as the police having honored their commitment to provide counsel.”).  
338. Id. at 1223 (majority opinion). 
339. Id. 
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holdings.340  That is precisely the situation when considering how to treat 
invocations of Miranda rights.  Weighing in favor of such a definite time, 
according to the Court, was the benefit to be achieved by this relatively 
bright-line rule that officers will know with certainty when 
reinterrogation is permitted after the defendant has been returned to 
custody.341  The Court viewed Justice Stevens’ apparent case-by-case 
approach to be “less helpful, but not at all less arbitrary.”342 
The Shatzer Court’s responses to both of the questions posed above 
regarding the need for and length required of a break in custody 
requirement for custodial suspects invoking their right to counsel apply 
with equal force to suspects who invoke their right to silence.343  First, 
the break in custody is needed to dissipate the likelihood that any 
statement made after invoking one’s right to silence has been achieved 
through the coercive effect of continued custody.344  As discussed above, 
the suspect who invokes his right to silence in custody suffers the same 
pressures to change his mind—due to the custodial environment—as 
does one who invokes his right to counsel.345  During a break from 
custody, the silence-invoking suspect, as is the counsel-invoking suspect, 
is free from the isolation and domination of police custody.346  He can 
use this time to consult with friends, family, and counsel about how he 
should proceed next.347  Should he change his mind and decide to 
respond to police interrogation once back in custody, this change is “less 
likely attributable to ‘badgering’ than it is to the fact that further 
deliberation in familiar surroundings has caused him to believe (rightly 
or wrongly) that cooperating with the investigation is in his interest.”348 
The current standard for whether a suspect who has invoked his 
right to silence while in custody may be reinterrogated depends on 
 
340. Id.  The Court noted that in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 
(1991), it specified forty-eight hours as the time within which the police must comply with the 
requirement of Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975), that a person arrested without a 
warrant be brought before a magistrate to establish probable cause for continued detention. 
341. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1222–23. 
342. Id. at 1226. 
343. Id. at 1223. 
344. See id. at 1222 (describing the same need for invocations of the right to counsel). 
345. See supra Part II (discussing Mosley); supra note 315 and accompanying text. 
346. See Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1221. 
347. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 221 F.3d 1048, 1053 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting that 
during a break in custody a suspect can consult with friends, family, or an attorney). 
348. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1221. 
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whether this right has been scrupulously honored by the police.349  Such 
a standard is far from the bright-line the Court implemented in Shatzer 
for reinterrogation of a suspect who invokes counsel.350  The phrase itself 
offers no clear guidance to the police for when they may reinterrogate 
such a suspect, and time required—a primary factor created by the 
Court in Mosley for determining whether silence has been scrupulously 
honored—also defies any bright-line application.351  The Court in Mosley 
spoke about the time between invocation of the right to silence and 
reinterrogation of the suspect as being a key factor in determining 
whether his right to silence has been honored.352  The Court’s position 
here was the longer the better.353  Unlike in Shatzer, however, no specific 
time period was required.354  Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the 
opinions of lower courts on the amount of time necessary to 
scrupulously honor the right to silence are inconsistent.355  Accordingly, 
police are not given clear guidance as to how long they must wait before 
reinterrogating a suspect who invokes his right to silence.  The need for 
a bright-line time period in determining when police can reinterrogate a 
suspect who invokes his right to silence is no less necessary than for 
determining when a defendant who invokes his right to counsel may be 
 
349. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103 (1975) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 479 (1966)). 
350. See Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1223 (noting that a fourteen-day break in custody is the 
bright-line rule for reinterrogation of an individual who has invoked his right to counsel). 
351. See supra note 109. 
352. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104. 
353. See id. at 102 (“To permit the continuation of custodial interrogation after a 
momentary cessation would clearly frustrate the purposes of Miranda by allowing repeated 
rounds of questioning to undermine the will of the person being questioned.”). 
354. Id. at 104 (noting that the key inquiry was that a reasonable amount of time elapse 
between interrogations and holding that two hours was reasonable). 
355. See United States v. Thompson, 866 F.2d 268, 271–72 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding 
defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights were not violated when law enforcement officers 
resumed questioning approximately thirty minutes after defendant had invoked his right to 
remain silent); United States v. Hsu, 852 F.2d 407, 411–12 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding same); 
Stock v. State, 191 P.3d 153, 155–56, 161 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008) (holding same).  But see 
United States v. Samuel, No. 09-CR-128A(Sr), 2010 WL 3091934, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. July 14, 
2010) (“[T]here can be no dispute that the thirty to forty-five minute interval of time in the 
instant case does not constitute a sufficient break in custody for Miranda purposes.”), report 
and recommendation adopted, No. 09-CR-128, 2010 WL 3091704, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 
2010); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 386 N.E.2d 15, 19 (Mass. 1979) (defendant’s right to silence 
not scrupulously honored when there was only thirty minutes between interrogations and 
other Mosley factors); Commonwealth v. Callender, 960 N.E.2d 910, 914, 916 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2012) (invocation of the right to silence not scrupulously honored when only thirty-five 
minutes passed between interrogations). 
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reinterrogated.356 
The Court thus laid the groundwork for finally doing away with the 
distinction that has existed since Mosley and Edwards.  Because the 
coercive pressures of custodial reinterrogation are the same whether a 
suspect invokes his right to counsel or his right to silence—as are many 
other aspects of the two invocations—the ability of the police to 
question the suspect regardless of which right he claimed should be the 
same as well.  The police should not be permitted to reinterrogate a 
suspect who invokes his right to silence and remains in police custody 
any more than they are allowed to reinterrogate one who invokes his 
right to counsel.  If the suspect is freed from custody for sufficient time, 
then the effects of the original custody, which led the suspect to invoke 
his Miranda protection, could be said to have dissipated.  As it is 
important to give the police clear guidance as to when they can 
reinterrogate such a suspect,357 the fourteen-day break-in-custody period 
required by the Court in Shatzer regarding counsel invocations should 
apply as well to police reinterrogation of suspects who have invoked 
their right to silence. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This article explored the differential treatment the Supreme Court 
has accorded to the reinterrogation of suspects in custody who have 
invoked their rights to silence and counsel.  It found this differential 
 
356. In fact, in certain situations, the need for a bright-line rule may be greater when the 
suspect invokes his right to silence.  Comparing an invocation of the right to silence with the 
events that occurred in Minnick where the suspect actually spoke with his attorney after 
invoking his right to counsel before the police reinterrogated him, Donald Dripps wrote, 
“[T]he need for a bright-line rule seems stronger in the case of the right to silence, again 
because the absence of defense counsel expands the practical latitude enjoyed by the police.”  
Dripps, supra note 32, at 16.  
357. One commentator enumerated the benefits of such a bright line as follows: 
Obviously clear rules serve many useful purposes.  They provide guidance to the 
police in determining the constitutionality of interrogations.  Specific guidelines are 
particularly useful in the area of interrogation where vague, general guidance may 
give the police significant leeway to wear down the accused and persuade him to 
incriminate himself.  Moreover, precise and defined rules help inform the courts in 
determining when statements obtained during police interrogations may be properly 
suppressed.  Judicial resources which would otherwise be expended making difficult 
assessments concerning the admissibility of confessions are thus conserved.  
Accordingly, specificity in rules benefit the accused and the state alike.  
Strauss, supra note 71, at 377 (footnotes omitted). 
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treatment to be unsupported by the Fifth Amendment, the decision in 
Miranda, or the pragmatic assumptions upon which the distinction was 
created and expanded. 
This differential treatment has led to judicial opinions that are 
inconsistent, unjust, and often nonsensical.  In two recent holdings, the 
Court has articulated principles behind the Miranda protections that 
apply to invocations of the rights to silence and counsel equally.  These 
principles point the way out of the problems created by treating the 
invocation of these rights differently.  Whether a suspect in custody 
invokes his right to silence or to counsel, custodial reinterrogation 
without counsel initiated by the police should be permitted only after a 
fourteen-day break in custody.  This break in custody allows the suspect 
time to consult family, friends, and counsel, and thus, reduces the 
likelihood that his reinterrogation once back in custody would be the 
product of the very coercion that the Fifth Amendment and Miranda 
were designed to prevent. 
 
